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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
by
Thomas P. Sartwelle*

F

EDERAL government threats and pressure forced the Texas Legislature
to amend extensively the Workmen's Compensation Act in 1971' and

19732 and to add eight less extensive amendments in 1975. 3 In 1977 continued
congressional pressure and mounting public criticism portend more surgery
on the existing Act by the Texas Legislature or perhaps even a federal

autocratic system of national workmen's compensation. The probable and
potential changes in the structure of workmen's compensation law as well as

the significant judicial interpretation of the existing law occurring during this
survey year will be analyzed and discussed herein.
1977
In 1970 Congress created the National Commission on State Workmen's
I.

POTENTIAL FEDERAL AND STATE AMENDMENTS IN

Compensation Laws. 4 The Commission's purpose was to present "an effec-

tive study and objective evaluation of State workmen's compensation laws in
order to determine if such laws provide an adequate, prompt, and equitable

system of compensation for injury or death arising out of or in the course of
employment." ' 5 In its report in 1972 the Commission concluded that "state
workmen's compensation laws are in general neither adequate nor equitable." 6 As a result of that report two all-encompassing bills were submitted to
Congress in 19737 requiring application of the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act 8 to workers in all fifty states. 9 Although these
bills have been abandoned, there are currently pending in both houses of
Congress two similar bills' 0 entitled the National Workers' Compensation Act
* B.B.A., LL.B., The University of Texas. Attorney at Law, Houston, Texas.
1. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 8306, 8307, 8309 (Vernon Supp. 1976-77). These
amendments are discussed in Sartwelle, Workmen's Compensation, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 183 (1975) and Collins, Workmen's Compensation, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 131 (1974).
2. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 8306, 8307, 8309 (Vernon Supp. 1976-77). These
amendments are discussed in Sartwelle, supra note I.
3. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 8307, 8309 (Vernon Supp. 1976-77). These
amendments as well as the 1971 and 1973 amendments are discussed in Sartwelle, Workmen's
Compensation, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 213 (1976).
4. 29 U.S.C. § 676 (1970).
5. Id. § 676(a)(2).
6. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS, THE REPORT OFTHE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS 25 (July 1972). Adequate

was defined as "delivering sufficient benefits and services to meet the objectives of the
program." Id. at 137. Equitable was defined as:
Delivering benefits and services fairly as judged by the program's consistency
in providing equal benefits or services to workers in identical circumstances and
its rationality in providing benefits and services in proportion to the impairment
or disability for those with different degrees of loss. Equitable compensation is
not necessarily adequate.
Id.
7. S. 2008, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 8771, 93d Cong., IstSess. (1973).
8. 33 U.S.C. § 901 (1970).
9. S. 2008, 93d Cong., IstSess. (1973).
10. S. 2018, 94th Cong., IstSess. (1975); H.R. 15609, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). The
governmental relations office of the American Bar Association reports that as of Nov. 9, 1976,
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of 1975. If enacted these bills would permanently annihilate state control of
workmen compensation systems and laws, and federalize workmen compensation benefits for employees throughout the nation.
While it is generally agreed that state compensation laws need to be
updated, recodification coupled with the upgrading of coverage and benefits
would accomplish the objectives set forth by the National Commission:
adequacy, equitability, and promptness. As eloquently stated by one observer, "federalization of the states' systems is analogous to using a hammer
to repair a watch."'" In fact, the Commission declared: "A federal
takeover would substantially disrupt established administrative arrangements. Moreover, most Commissioners believe there is no evidence that
12
federal administrative procedures are superior to those of the states.'
Professor Albert Millus, discussing the proposed federal takeover, cogently
notes:
One lesson history teaches us is that federal government is not the
solution to all of the social ills of the day nor is administration of a
program by the federal government an automatic guarantee of its success. We need only look at the present status of the social security and
postal service systems as examples. 3
However unsound the federalization approach might be, the inadequacies
of the Texas compensation program cannot be ignored. Although Texas has
one of the best business climates in the United States, workmen's compensation benefits are among the lowest in the nation while premiums are among the
highest. ' 4 The Texas Association of Business has been exceedingly critical of
this state's compensation program 5 and intends to present reform legislation
to the Sixty-Fifth Legislature. The Association has proposed increased weekly
benefits, reduction of attorneys' fees to a maximum fifteen percent, vocational rehabilitation, limitation to a single total and permanent recovery, self
insurance, and price competition among insurers. 6 Moreover, the Texas
House Judiciary Committee in August of 1976 approved recommendations
the House Education and Labor Committee approved H.R. 15609 on Sept. 17, 1976. The Senate
Labor and Public Welfare subcommittee hearings began March 4, 1976, with no decision reported
as of Nov. 9, 1976. 62 A.B.A.J. 1629 (1976). The American Bar Association opposes federal
standards. Id.
11. Millus, Is Federalization of Workmen's Compensation Inevitable, 62 A.B.A.J. 1010,
1011 (1976).
12.

NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS, supra note 6, at

126.
13. Millus, supra note II, at 1014.
14. Gray, A Reformation ProposalforWorker Compensation Laws, Hous. Bus. J., July 19,
1976, at 4. For example, New York pays weekly benefits of $125; Texas pays $70. In New York
the annual premium totals $500 million and covers more workers than the $655 million collected in
Texas. Id.
15. The president of the Association summarizes the shortcomings of the Texas system thus:
Today the workers' compensation law in Texas doesn't. It doesn't adequately
compensate the worker. It doesn't allow the employer to insure himself against
his employee's accidents or intercede on their behalf in settlements. It doesn't
allow price competition. It doesn't allow the Industrial Accident Board . . . to
protect the workers to the best of its ability. And, it doesn't provide sure, prompt
and reasonable income and medical benefits to workers injured on the job.
Id. at 2-3.
16. Id. at 4.
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for extensive changes in the Compensation Act, including raising the maximum weekly benefits to $135.17
The widespread criticism and specific proposals portend drastic changes
which will significantly affect workmen's compensation practice. The only
remaining question is whether the "American worker . . . and the national
interest are best served by a comprehensive national workers' compensation
system 18 or whether the proposed federal system "might... serve as the
• . .[vehicle] for modernizing and upgrading the states' workmen's compensation law." 9 The prospect of "using a hammer to repair a watch" 20 concerns
many of the groups and individuals involved in the compensation process 2
and should concern the lawyers of Texas.

II.

SUBSTANTIVE LAW

IndustrialAccident Board. In the last survey year the Industrial Accident
Board sought to restrict access to the Board's files 22 despite the Texas Open
Records Act. 23 This year the Texas Supreme Court upheld the public's right to
gain access to government records. 24 In the course of its opinion the court
rejected the Board's contention that its Board Rule 9.040,25 denying access to
Board records except to specified individuals, had the force and effect of
law.26 This holding again emphasizes that the Board's rule-making power is
limited to the specific provisions of the Compensation Act.27
In another test of the Board's power the Austin court of civil appeals
reviewed the Board's authority to issue "nonappealable" orders in Yarborough v. IndustrialAccident Board.28 The claimant instituted a mandamus
action seeking to compel the Board to hold a final hearing on his compensation claim. After failing to reach a settlement at the pre-hearing conference,2 9
the Board, on its own motion, canceled the previously scheduled final
hearing. The Board then ordered the insurer to institute specific compensation payments to the claimant's guardian and his attorneys, stating that the
17. Houston Chronicle, Aug. 29, 1976, § 1, at 9.
18. S. 2018, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
19. Millus, supra note 11, at 1014.
20. Id. at 1011.
21. One example is the Southern Association of Workmen's Compensation Administrators,
founded for the express purpose of preventing federal pre-emption of the compensation field.
The current president of SAWCA is the Honorable Cue D. Boykin, the chairman of the Texas
Industrial Accident Board. Chairman Boykin has written an article concerning the Board's work
which is recommended for anyone desiring to grasp the enormity of the Board's and its
chairman's function. Boykin, The Texas IndustrialAccident Board:An Insider'sPoint of View, 9
TRIAL LAW. F., Jan.-March 1975, at 5.
22. Texas Indus. Accident Bd. v. Industrial Foundation, 526 S.W.2d 211 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1975), reviewed in Sartwelle, supra note 3, at 215-16.
23. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a (Vernon Supp. 1976-77). See generally
Comment, Texas Open Records Act: Law Enforcement Agencies' Investigatory Records, 29
Sw. L.J. 431 (1975).
24. Industrial Foundation v. Texas Indus. Accident Bd., 540 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. 1976), aff'g
526 S.W.2d 211 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1975).
25. Tex. Indus. Accident Bd. Rules 9.040 (1974).
26. 540 S.W.2d at 676-77.
27. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 4 (Vernon 1967). "The Board may make rules not
inconsistent with this law for carrying out and enforcing its provisions." The Board is also
granted limited rule-making power to govern pre-hearing conferences. Id. § 10(b) (Vernon Supp.
1976-77); see Sartwelle, supra note 3, at 215-18 nn.18-38 and accompanying text.
28. 538 S.W.2d 19 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
29. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 10 (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
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order was "not a final award of the Board and no appeal shall be taken
therefrom." 30 The Board, represented by the attorney general, levied special
exceptions to the claimant's petition. The trial court sustained the exceptions,
and on the claimant's refusal to amend the suit was dismissed. On appeal the
Board contended that it had authority to issue the nonappealable order under
article 8309a.3 1 This article provides that the Board in its discretion may
postpone a hearing, without appeal, in certain defined situations: first, when
the claimant is receiving compensation and medical benefits; and second,
when the parties fail to file written medical reports when requested to do so by
the Board. 32 In Yarborough the court noted that the claimant had pleaded that
the carrier had failed and refused to pay three specific medical bills incurred
for treatment of his injuries. Since the claimant's suit had been dismissed
after sustaining special exceptions, the court accepted the allegations as
true.33 Thus, the conditions specified in article 8309a were not met, and the
34
court held that the Board had no authority to postpone the final hearing.
Twin City Fire Insurance Co. v. Foster35 presented a challenge to the
Board's authority to review its orders upon a showing of change of condition,
mistake, or fraud. Affirming this power of the Board, the Texarkana court of
civil appeals examined several aspects of article 8306, section 12d. 36 On
February 9, 1971, the Board entered a final award for temporary total and
permanent partial compensation benefits. No appeal was filed. Subsequently, the claimant filed an application to increase the initial award, but the Board
rejected the request by its order of February 2, 1972, finding no change of
condition, fraud, or mistake. No appeal was filed. The claimant filed a second
application for review in December 1973 which the Board granted by an order
entered September 26, 1974. The 1974 Board order vacated all previous
awards and orders, finding that a mistake and error was made in the first two
awards; the Board then awarded the claimant total and permanent benefits.
The carrier appealed, contending, inter alia, that the second Board order
amounted to an order denying compensation and, therefore, under article
8306 the Board was without authority to amend or cancel its previous order
after twelve months. At trial the jury found that the original award was the
result of a mistake and that the claimant's condition changed after the Board's
second order denying the claimant's application to increase compensation
benefits. Thus, the trial court entered judgment setting aside the Board's first
two orders and awarding the claimant total and permanent benefits. On
30. 538 S.W.2d at 20.
31.
32.

TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8309a (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
Id.

33. 538 S.W.2d at 21.
34. Id. The judgment of the trial court was reversed and the cause remanded. Id.
35. 537 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
36. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 12d (Vernon 1967) provides:
Upon its own motion or upon the application of any person interested showing
a change of condition, mistake or fraud, the Board at any time within the
compensation period, may review any award or order, ending, diminishing or
increasing compensation previously awarded, within the maximum and minimum
provided in this law, or change or revoke its previous order denying compensation . . . . Provided, when such previous order has denied compensation,

application to review same shall be made to the Board within twelve months after
its entry, and not afterward.
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appeal the claimant contended that the mistake occurring in the initial award
was the Board's failure to consider certain medical reports indicating that he
had undergone back surgery prior to the Board's original award. The change
of condition occurring after the Board's denial of the first application for
increased benefits was the claimant's subsequent loss of urinary control and
impairment of sexual function.
As analyzed by the court, the question for decision was whether the
Board's February 1972 order constituted an "order denying compensation."
If so, the claimant's second application for reconsideration in December 1973
was not within the statutorily required twelve-month limitation period. If not,
the application was clearly within the compensation period and, therefore,
timely filed. The court of civil appeals, correctly it seems, held that the
February 1972 order was not an order denying compensation "within the
intent and meaning of Section 12d of Article 8306.' 3 The court reasoned that
when compensation has been awarded, there is a "built-in" limitation period:
the compensation period. If compensation is denied, however, there is no
limitation period except the twelve-month period designated by statute. The
February 1972 order did not deny compensation; "[i]t simply declined to
change the compensation which had been previously awarded. "38 This denial
did not change the fact that the limitation applicable to the initial award was
still the compensation period. The court then turned to the question of
whether the Board was authorized to set aside the initial order because of
mistake after denying such mistake on one other occasion. As the court
noted, a mistake must be one of fact and not an error of law or judgment.3 9The
court held that a mistake of fact as to the actual injuries received, whether
made by the claimant, the insurer, or the Board, independent of any issue of
fraud, was a mistake within the meaning of the statute.4 Thus, the court
upheld the jury's finding of mistake. In a related attack the carrier contended
that, if the Board did indeed make a mistake in its first award by failing to
consider certain medical reports, this mistake was known to the Board when it
denied the first application for reconsideration and that such denial was
therefore res judicata. The court considered this unique argument but rejected the contention because the record did not reveal what, if anything, the
Board considered in February 1972. 41 Since it is incumbent upon the party
claiming identity of issues to produce evidence of such identity 42 and since
none was produced, the carrier's argument was rejected.
In recent years the Industrial Accident Board has attempted to expand its
authority over the particpants in the compensation process. For example,
article 8309a 43 was enacted as a direct result of the Board's attempt in an
37.

537 S.W.2d at 762.

38.

Id.

39. Id., citing General Am. Cas. Co. v. Rosas, 275 S.W.2d 570 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1955, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. Shank, 140 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1940, writ dism'd jdgmt cor.).
40. 537 S.W.2d at 762.
41. Id. at 763.
42. Id. citing cases.
9
43. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 830 a (Vernon Supp. 1976-77); see text accompanying
notes 31-32 supra.
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earlier case" to postpone a final hearing because a claimant had refused to file
medical reports as requested by the Board. The Board was compelled to hear
the claim, however, since there was at that time no provision in the compensation law authorizing such an order.45 More recently the Board has invoked its
power to inquire into matters of fact and take testimony4 6 in order to hold
formal hearings in selected cases. Numerous formal hearings, however,
appear to be held only to demonstrate the Board's power and to pressure
carriers into settlements. This has been particularly true of claims wherein the
carrier disputed the occurrence of the alleged accidental injury. As long as
Texas retains the de novo appeal, the majority of the Board's formal hearings
serve little useful purpose except to delay the inevitable appeal by one party
or the other. The Board's final award, based upon sworn evidence taken at a
formal hearing, adds nothing to a de novo trial. On the other hand, the Board
may accomplish the desired result: a fair, prompt, final award, by the less
formal, less expensive, and less time consuming pre-hearing conference.47
Medical Services-Open Medical. It has become common practice in recent
years to use "open medical" provisions in compromise settlement agreements and agreed final judgments. These open medical provisions benefit
both parties since they provide the carrier with a limit to the lifetime medical
benefits and allow the claimant to obtain medical services without the
necessity of making a medical expense claim before the Board every six
months.' Despite the frequency of their use, open medical provisions seldom
reach the appellate courts. Until this survey year only one reported opinion49
has interpreted or enforced an open medical provision which was contained in
an agreed judgment. This year in Moore v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty
Co. ,0 the Amarillo court of appeals was required to determine the effect of an
open medical provision in a compromise settlement agreement approved by
the Industrial Accident Board.
The claimant and carrier entered into a compromise settlement agreement
for a specific lump sum compensation payment plus a three-year open
medical provision which was limited to expenses incurred under the treatment of five specific physicians "but excluding any psychiatric care." 5' Two
months after the Board approved the settlement agreement the claimant
submitted for payment various medical bills from physicians other than the
five specified in the agreement, as well as medicines and hospitalization
prescribed by the non-named doctors. One of the designated physicians had
referred the claimant to a nondesignated doctor for examination and treatment, but the carrier refused to pay the expenses. The claimant filed a
declaratory judgment suit to determine the carrier's liability for the expenses
44. Kelley v. Industrial Accident Bd., 358 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1962, writ
ref'd).
45. Id.
46. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 4(Vernon 1967), § 10(a)(Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
47. Id. § 10 (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
48. Id. art. 8306, § 7 (Vernon 1967).
49. Threet v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 516 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1974, no
writ), reviewed in Sartwelle, supra note 1, at 217-18.

50. 533 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
51. Id.at 172.
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and to obtain an interpretation of the carrier's future liability. The trial court

granted the carrier's motion for summary judgment and rendered a take
nothing judgment on the claimant's claim for medical expenses.
The claimant contended that the purpose, spirit, and intent of article 8306,
section 7,52 were incorporated by reference in the agreement. The court of
civil appeals, however, relying upon well-established law, held that a compromise settlement agreement approved by the Industrial Accident Board is
binding upon the parties unless set aside." Since the agreement expressly
provided for treatment by specified physicians without reference to referrals,
and since the "employee's benefits are measured by and limited to the
specific terms of the agreement as approved by the Board," 54 the trial court's
judgment was affirmed.

The court's holding enforcing the strict terms of the agreement is correct,
but the reasoning is somewhat obscure. If the court's reason for enforcing the
agreement is because the Board approved the agreement, the holding is
invalid. Board approval of a compromise settlement agreement is neither an
award of compensation nor a denial thereof, nor is it an adjudication of the
merits of the case." Board approval is simply approval of a contract settling a
dispute between parties as authorized by statute.5 6 Board approval of a

settlement should certainly not have any greater degree of sanctity than court
approval of an agreed judgment. Court approved agreed judgments become
written contracts enforceable under the general rules relating to contract
construction.

7

The Industrial Accident Board recently revealed its latest attempt to usurp
undelegated authority when it announced that its compromise settlement
agreement form will be amended with respect to future medical benefits to
contain the following clause:

It is the express agreement of the parties to the compromise settlement
agreement that the Board shall have continuing jurisdiction of all medical
benefits provided by this compromise settlement agreement and the
52. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 7 (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
53. 533 S.W.2d at 173, citing cases.
54. Id.
55. Lowery v. Anderson-Berney Bldg. Co., 139 Tex. 29, 161 S.W.2d 459(1942); Commercial
Cas. Ins. Co. v. Hilton, 126 Tex. 497, 87 S.W.2d 1081 (1935); Pearce v. Texas Employers' Ins.
Ass'n, 403 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1966), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 412 S.W.2d
647 (Tex. 1967); Great Am. Indem. Co. v. Blakey, 151 S.W.2d 318 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1941, writ dism'd jdgmt cor.); Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. King & Co., 96 S.W.2d 251 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1936, no writ).
56. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 12 (Vernon 1967): "Where the liability of the
association or the extent of the injury of the employee is uncertain, indefinite or incapable of
being satisfactorily established, the board may approve any compromise, adjustment, settlement
or commutation thereof made between the parties." See Brannon v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co.,
148 Tex. 289, 224 S.W.2d 466 (1949);Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Kennedy, 135 Tex. 486, 143
S.W.2d 583 (1940); Commercial Cas. Ins. Co. v. Hilton, 126 Tex. 497, 87 S.W.2d 1081 (1935);
Moore v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 533 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Threet v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 516 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1974, no writ); Gibson v. Employers' Liab. Assurance Corp., 131 S.W.2d 327 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1939, writ ref'd); Wood v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 82 S.W.2d 421 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1935, writ ref'd); cf. Finch v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 535 S.W.2d 201
(Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (suit by employee for anticipatory breach of
compromise settlement agreement).
57. Threet v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 516 S.W.2d 276(Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1974, no
writ).
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Texas Workmen's Compensation Act until all obligations described
herein are fully discharged.58
The Board apparently intends to force claimants and carriers to agree to
Board supervision over future medical benefits by refusing to approve any
compromise settlement agreement which does not contain the quoted clause.
The question arises, however, whether the Board has the authority to impose
supervisory jurisdiction over what amounts to a settlement contract between
adversaries. The Industrial Accident Board is not a court but is an administrative body created by statute and vested with only those powers conferred by
statute; 59 thus, the Board's continuing jurisdiction must be derived from
statutory authority. An examination of the Compensation Act does not reveal
any direct statutory authority granting the Board continuing jurisdiction over
any aspect of a compromise settlement agreement. The Board may contend,
however, that such power is granted by implication by the two sections of the
Compensation Act relating to compromise and settlement of compensation
cases: article 8307, sections 560 and 12.61 These two sections clearly indicate
that the legislature contemplated that the parties to a compensation action
would compromise and settle, between themselves, and with the approval of
the Board, all issues raised by a compensation claim. The question is whether
the legislature contemplated compromise and settlement of future medical
benefits.
The legislature amended the medical care provision of the Compensation
Act in 1957 to provide for unlimited lifetime medical benefits. 62 At the same
time the legislature provided in article 8307, section 5,63 that no award of the
Board and no judgment of a court could include the cost or expense of medical
care and services which had not actually been rendered at the time of the
award of judgment. This section also provided that the employee would file
all claims for future medical expenses with the Board every six months.64 The
Board was given continuing jurisdiction to render successive awards for the
65
cost and expense of medical services.
After the passage of the future medical provisions, the question arose
whether a claimant could compromise and settle his right to future medical
services in view of section 5, which appeared to vest jurisdiction over future
medical benefits in the Board or a court. This question was answered
affirmatively in Pearce v. Texas Employers'InsuranceAss 'n.6 In that case
58. Proposed Industrial Accident Board Compromise Settlement Agreement form.
59. Middleton v. Texas Power & Light Co., 108 Tex. 96, 185 S.W. 556 (1916); Bailey v. Texas
Indem. Ins. Co., 14 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929, jdgmt adopted); Poe v. Continental Oil
& Cotton Co., 231 S.W. 717 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1921, holding approved); Kelley v. Industrial
Accident Bd., 358 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1962, writ ref'd); Burton v. I.C.T. Ins.
Co., 304 S.W.2d 292 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1957, no writ).
60. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 5 (Vernon 1967), which, in its first sentence,
provides: "All questions arising under this law, if not settled by agreement of the parties
interested therein and within the provisions of this law, shall, except as otherwise provided, be
determined by the Board."
61. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 12 (Vernon 1967); see note 56 supra.
62. 1957 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 397, § 1, at 1186 (codified at TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art.
8306, § 7 (Vernon 1967)).
63. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 5 (Vernon 1967).

64. Id.
65. Id.

66.

403 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1966), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 412 S.W.2d

647 (Tex. 1967).
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the claimant and the carrier entered into a written compromise settlement
agreement terminating the carrier's liability for future medical expenses.
The agreement was approved by the Board. Subsequently, the claimant filed
with the Board another claim requesting payment of additional medical bills.
The Board rejected the claim and the claimant filed suit. The trial court
sustained the carrier's motion for summary judgment, and the claimant
appealed, contending that section 5 of article 8307 prohibited the courts and
the Board from rendering judgments or awards for medical expenses not yet
actually incurred. Therefore, the claimant argued, an employee could not
make, nor did the Board have authority to approve, a compromise settlement
terminating the employee's right to future medical expenses. The court of
civil appeals rejected the claimant's argument, finding authority for the
employee's compromise of his compensation claim and for the Board's
approval thereof in article 8307, section 12.67 Further, the court found that
section 5 and section 12 related to different aspects of the compensation
scheme and thus were not inconsistent. 68 Whereas section 5 deals entirely
with final decisions and awards, the court determined that section 12 deals
with compromise settlements "agreed upon to avoid adjudication by final
award."1

69

The Texas Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, 70 specifically approved
the court of civil appeals opinion construing the wording of the statute and
specifically approved its holding in this regard. 71 Thus, there is absolutely no
question that an employee may compromise and settle his right to72 future
medical expenses, subject to the approval of the Board or a court.
The Board's contention that it has continuing jurisdiction over future
medical provisions in a compromise settlement agreement cannot be founded
upon section 5 of article 8307.73 According to Pearce, that portion of the
statute is limited to awards and judgments of a court. 74 It is well settled that
Board approval of a compromise settlement agreement is neither an award of
compensation nor a denial thereof nor is it an adjudication of the merits of the
75
case.
67. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 12 (Vernon 1967); see note 56 supra.
68. 403 S.W.2d at 498.
69. Id. The court summarized the effect of the 1957 amendments upon § 5 and § 12 thus:
Both before and after the 1957 amendments [slection 5 provided for the method
of appeal to the courts, but always from a 'final award' or 'successive awards'
thereafter. But the approval by the Board of a compromise settlement agreement
is neither an award of compensation nor a denial thereof ...
Prior to the 1957 amendments the claimant could lawfully compromise his
claim for past and future [disability, medical, and hospital benefits] . . . . We
find nothing in the 1957 amendments to indicate a change of legislative intent or
policy in this respect. The law favors the settlement of controversies by compromise as being in the interest of the public.
Id.

70. Pearce v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 412 S.W.2d 647 (Tex. 1967).

71. Id. at 649.
72. Finch v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 535 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Barnes v. Bituminous Cas. Corp., 495 S.W.2d 5 (Tex. Civ. App.Amarillo 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co. v. Frierson, 455 S.W.2d 370 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1970, no writ).
73. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 5 (Vernon 1967); see note 60 supra.
74. See note 69 supra.
75. Cases cited at note 55 supra.
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It is true that the Compensation Act provides that the Board must approve
every compromise settlement agreement, and each agreement must be within
the provisions of the compensation law. 76 Board approval of a compromise
settlement agreement, however, does not change the character of the compromise settlement agreement, which is no more and no less than a contract of
settlement between the parties. 77 It is quite obvious that the language of
sections 5 and 12 indicates the legislative intent that the parties to a compensation action may compromise and settle all issues raised by a compensation
claim, subject to the approval of the Board. The fact that the Board is a forum
for settlement was early recognized in this state. For example, in Poe v.
Continental Oil & Cotton Co. ,7 a case involving waiver of a common law
cause of action because of acceptance of compensation benefits, the court
characterized the Accident Board as "an administrative board where in79
terested parties can reach amicable adjustments quickly."
Section 5 was part of the original Compensation Act passed in 1913, and the
wording of the 1913 section 580 was similar to the wording today, 81providing
that all issues, if not settled by agreement of the parties, shall be determined
by the Board. In Jenkins v. Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n 82 the court
construed section 5 as follows:
The language 'if not settled by agreement of parties interested,' would
appear to show the clear purpose of the Act to authorize and continue the
inherent right of parties to make such fair and reasonable compromise
settlement of the claim for compensation as they may themselves determine, and without the approval of the Board. The potentialjurisdiction8of
3
the Board ceases, then, with the settlement by agreement of the parties.
In 1917 the forerunner to the present section 5 was amended to adopt the
precise language which is now contained in section 5.84 This portion of the
statute was involved in two cases reaching the commission of appeals in 1929.
In Texas Employers'InsuranceAss 'n v. Ezell8 5 the court was concerned with
a settlement approved by a district court and reflected by an agreed final
judgment. In affirming the district court's judgement, the court noted that
"[t]here is nothing in the compensation statutes

. . .

to prevent the parties

from making any compromise and settlement of the suit they may choose to
87
make." 86 Similarly, the court in Lumbermen's Reciprocal Ass'n v. Day
determined that section 5 "recognizes the right of the party to make a
settlement provided for in [s]ection 12."88 Further, section 12 was construed
as providing for a suspension of the Board's factfinding authority and a
76. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, §§ 5, 12 (Vernon 1967).
77. Cases cited at note 56 supra.
78. 231 S.W. 717 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1921, holding approved).
79. Id. at 720.
80. 1913 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 5, § 5, at 429.
81. See note 60 supra.
82. 211 S.W. 349 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1919, writ ref'd).
83. Id. at 349-50 (emphasis added).
84. 1917 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 103, § 5, at 895.
85. 14 S.W.2d 1018 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929, jdgmt adopted).
86. Id. at 1019.
87. 17 S.W.2d 1043 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929, jdgmt adopted).

88. Id. at 1044.
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substitution for it of the parties' independent settlement agreement.89 Thus,
the claimant's request to reopen, for change of condition, a Board-approved
settlement agreement was refused. The court reasoned that the parties had
substituted their agreement for the Board's action and had necessarily
contemplated the subsequent change of condition in making their
settlement.90
Based upon the courts' interpretation of section 5 and section 12, it appears
that parties to a compensation suit do have an inherent right to compromise
and settle a claim and preclude the Industrial Accident Board from acting, in
any manner, on the claim, with the exception of approving the settlement.
The Board's approval is, of course, necessary to protect the rights of
claimants from overreaching by a more powerful adversary. Once the compromise is approved, however, the Board's jurisdiction terminates. The
primary reason for compromise is to dispose expeditiously of all of the
potential issues existing between the claimant and the carrier. Disposing of
the Board's jurisdiction is obviously one of the benefits of a compromise
settlement. If the parties must incur the time and monetary expense involved
in continuous Board hearings and reports, there would be no particular
benefit to compromise. This does not mean that a claimant, or a carrier, is
without an available remedy to enforce any future medical provisions in the
agreement. The future medical provision of a compromise settlement agreement becomes a written contract enforceable by the courts under the general
rules relating to contracts.9 1 Thus, a claimant or carrier is well protected even
after the Board's jurisdiction terminates.
A logical, practical view of negotiated future medical provisions would
seem to preponderate in favor of allowing the parties to negotiate the length
and terms of future medical benefits and to work out the practicalities of
implementing the agreement. If the Board successfully interferes in the
implementation of future medical agreements, its action will probably force
carriers into the position of simply leaving future medical benefits open under
the terms of the Compensation Act. This would have the result of forcing each
claimant to file each individual medical bill with the Board every six months. 92
If the carrier then does not voluntarily pay the expenses, the Board would be
forced to make an award, and each such award could be appealed to a district
court just as can any other Board award. 93 If every single claimant must file
his or her medical bills with the Board, and the Board in turn must make an
award in each case, what incentive is there for the carrier not to continue the
process in district court? After all, most plaintiffs' attorneys will find it
difficult to pursue a "medical expense only" claim since attorneys' fees are
not generally awarded out of medical expenses. Thus, a claimant is forced to
seek legal services on an hourly fee basis or perhaps do without. Crowded
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1044-45.
91. Moore v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 533 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Threet v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 516 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1974, no writ).
92. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 5 (Vernon 1967).
93. Id.
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dockets in most urban areas will delay trials and, therefore, payments.
Delayed payments will primarily affect doctors and hospitals since a claimant
may not have funds to make payments as services are rendered. Overall, it
would appear that the Board, in asserting its continuing jurisdiction, is
actually defeating its purpose of helping claimants secure fair treatment under
the Compensation Act.
While the Board has not attempted to codify this amendment to the
compromise settlement agreement form as a Board rule, it may take the
position that changing the compromise settlement agreement form is analogous to passing a Board rule. Article 8307, section 494 provides that the Board
may make "rules not inconsistent with this law for carrying out and enforcing
its provisions .... .,,5 The Board's rule-making power, however, is limited.
The Industrial Accident Board is not a court but is an administrative body
created by statute and vested with only those powers conferred by statute.'
Thus, a Board rule not founded on a specific legislative grant of authority
would be invalid. 97 As previously demonstrated herein, the Compensation
Act has not granted the Board, directly or indirectly, the power to retain
jurisdiction over future medical provisions in a compromise settlement
agreement. Thus, it is quite obvious that the Board could not simply pass a
Board rule stating that the Board is retaining jurisdiction over future medical
provisions. Since the Board is bypassing the rule-making stage in arbitrarily
amending a Board form, the amendment also would be invalid.
Future Medical and Third-PartySuits. The statutory scheme for subrogation and recovery from third parties was completely revised in 1973 when the
legislature amended article 8307, section 6a. 98 The amended section is complicated and somewhat vague. At this writing, only two cases have considered
this new subrogation scheme: Simpson v. Texas Employers' Insurance
Ass 'n 9 and Finch v. Texas Employers'InsuranceAss 'n. " Unfortunately, it
has not been necessary for either court to interpret the actual provisions of the
statute. Simpson simply held the amendment to be substantive and not
procedural and, therefore, not retroactive.°10 Finch involved a compromise
settlement agreement which provided for lump sum payment of all past
medical expenses as well as total and permanent disability benefits. As to
future medical expenses, it was agreed the carrier would "pay for all future
hospital and medical expenses . . . authorized in advance by the associa-

tion." 10 2 Finch then sued the third party responsible for his injury. Finch
94. Id. § 4.
95. Id.
96. Cases cited at note 59 supra.
97. Industrial Foundation v. Texas Indus. Accident Bd., 540 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. 1976);
Jackson v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 471 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1971, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Kelley v. Industrial Accident Bd., 358 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1962,
writ ref'd); Burton v. I.C.T. Ins. Co., 304 S.W.2d 292 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1957, no writ).
98. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 6a (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
99. 519 S.W.2d 209 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.), reviewed in
Sartwelle, supra note 3, at 236.
100. 535 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
101. 519 S.W.2d at 209.
102. 535 S.W.2d at 202.
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recovered $250,000 out of which the carrier was reimbursed for the initial
compensation benefits paid pursuant to the compromise settlement agreement. Subsequent to the conclusion of the third-party suit, the claimant filed
suit against the carrier, alleging that it refused to pay for certain nursing
services and, therefore, committed an anticipatory breach of the settlement
contract.
The trial court granted the carrier's motion for summary judgment wherein
the carrier contended that it did not owe future medical expenses because the
employee waived his right to future medical payments when he recovered
damages from the third party. Alternatively, the Association asserted that it
was subrogated to Finch's third-party recovery to the extent that its liability
for future medical expenses did not attach until the sum recovered in the
third-party suit was used for medical expenses and exhausted.
The appellate court pointed out that the events giving rise to the employee's
1
cause of action occurred prior to 1973,1°3 before section 6a was amended. '
Thus, the carrier's subrogation right was governed by the provisions of the
statute as it existed prior to 1973. The precise contention advanced by the
carrier had been rejected by the Texas Supreme Court in Watson v. Glen Falls
Insurance Co. ," wherein the court held that the legislature did not include
future medical benefits within the subrogation rights granted to the Association. Accordingly, the court of civil appeals held that Finch's recovery in the
third-party action did not waive his right to future medical benefits and that
the carrier's subrogation right extended only to the compensation and medical
°
benefits paid under the terms of the compromise settlement agreement.'
judgment hearing, the case was
Due to fact issues raised in the 10summary
7
reversed and remanded for trial.
A claimant's right to lifetime medical benefits 0 8 can be very meaningful in
cases involving seriously disabling permanent injuries. The legislature's
subrogation-reimbursement scheme, however, is vague in many respects and
will undoubtedly foster much expensive litigation which will only cause
hardship for those seriously incapacitated workmen in need of assistance.
One portion of the statute causing some controversy is the portion applicable
to future medical benefits. 0 9 The last paragraph of section 6a provides that
the net amount" 0 recovered from a third party shall be applied to reimburse
103. In its opinion the court did not refer to any specific dates such as the date of accident or
the date the compromise settlement agreement was approved by the Board. It is difficult to
perceive from the opinion why the carrier argued that the new amendment applied to the case if it
was so obvious that all of the events transpired prior to the 1973 amendment, especially in view of
the opinion in Simpson, note 99 supra and accompanying text.
104. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 6a (Vernon Supp. 1976-77), as amended in 1973,
became effective Sept. 1, 1973.
105. 505 S.W.2d 793 (Tex. 1974).
106. 535 S.W.2d at 203.
107. Id. In remanding the case for trial, the court gratuitously noted that if the carrier was
guilty of an anticipatory breach of the compromise settlement agreement damages would be
recoverable, citing 13 TEX. JUR. 2d Contracts §§ 309, 315, 316 (1960).
108. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 7 (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
109. Id. art. 8307, § 6a.
110. The term "net amount" is ill-defined. The statute simply speaks in terms of deducting
"costs" and "attorney's fees" to arrive at what is assumed to be the "net amount" contemplated
by the statute. The question arises, however, as to the meaning of "costs." Does it mean taxable
court costs only or the expenses incurred in preparing and/or trying the suit, including travel
expenses, expert witness fees, deposition expenses, etc.?
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the Association for past compensation and medical expense payments. Any
amount in excess of these expenses is an advance against future benefits that
may be due, including compensation payments and medical expenses. If the
advance is exhausted at a time when the claimant or beneficiary is still entitled
to additional compensation or medical benefits, then the Association must
resume payments.
One commentator has taken the position that the claimant may arbitrarily
designate an amount of the third-party recovery as future medical, and when
that amount is exhausted, the Association would be required to continue
medical payments."'1 The suggestion apparently contemplates designating
specific portions of the third-party proceeds as recoveries for past and future12
wages, future medical expenses, pain and suffering, and disfigurement."
While this plan does have the appeal of simplicity, it is not in conformity with
the statute. Moreover, carried to its logical conclusion, it would allow the
claimant a windfall double recovery while increasing the cost of compensation and liability insurance. In the first place, the statute does not define "net
amount" in terms of individual recoveries for the various items of common
law compensatory damages. The statute simply provides that the amount
remaining after deducting costs and attorneys' fees "shall be treated as an
advance""13 against future compensation and medical payments. It is clear,
therefore, that the legislature intended that the entire amount of the net
recovery would be used to reduce compensation and medical payments and
not an amount arbitrarily designated to be future medical benefits or future
wages.
Suppose, for example, that a claimant recovered $200,000 and could
arbitrarily divide the net amount into categories. Suppose further that the net
amount, $100,000, was divided $10,000 for past wages, $15,000 for future
wage loss, $5,000 for future medical expenses, and the remainder as pain and
suffering, past and future. If total and permanent benefits plus past medical
expenses have already been paid and reimbursed to the Association, the only
remaining benefit under the Compensation Act is future medical expenses.
Must the Association begin paying such expenses when the claimant has
exhausted the $5,000 designated for future medical expenses? It is submitted
that the statute clearly indicates that the answer is in the negative. All of the
net amount is available as a credit against both future compensation and
future medical expenses.
Occupational Disease-RepetitiousPhysical Traumatic Activity. In 1971
the Sixty-Second Legislature significantly expanded the concept of occupational disease by repealing the occupational disease list" 4 and in its place
substituting a broad definition of "occupational disease."" 5 The definition
111. Curry, Texas Tips, 10 TRIAL LAW. F., Jan.-March 1976, at 50.
112. Id.
113. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 6a (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
114. 1947 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 113, § 2, at 176 (repealed 1971).
115.

TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 20 (Vernon Supp. 1976-77) provides:

[Occupational diseases] shall be construed to mean any disease arising out of and
in the course of employment which causes damage or harm to the physical
structure of the body and such other diseases or infections as naturally result
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transformed occupational disease from a specific list of physically induced
diseases into a definition which includes diseases arising out of the employment situation, as well as diseases induced by repetitious physical traumatic
activities. Surprisingly, the expanded occupational disease coverage has
engendered very little litigation reaching the appellate courts. This survey
year produced two opinions involved with repetitious traumatic activity, but
from 1971 to this survey year only one case had construed this portion of the
statute' 1 6 and only four other reported cases involved, inferentially, an
interpretation of other portions of the disease definition." 7 None of the
decisions have definitely interpreted the statute or come to grips with the
nagging questions raised by the wording of the definition." 8
Unfortunately, the two opinions during this survey year which dealt with
repetitious physical traumatic activities have not substantially furthered our
knowledge of the scope or limitations of amended section 20. They do,
however, illustrate the potential controversy which will inevitably surround
the occupational disease concept. StandardFire InsuranceCo. v. Ratcliff"9
involved a sewing machine operator who recovered for total permanent loss
of use of her right leg. The employee first suffered a compensable injury 20 to
her right knee in August 1972. After two surgeries were performed on her
knee, she returned to work. Her employer assigned her to a sewing machine
which did not require the use of her right leg. In December 1973, however, she
was transferred to another machine equipped with a lever which functioned
by knee pressure and which required the claimant to use her right knee to
activate the lever. In a short time the employee experienced pain and swelling
in her right knee whenever she pushed the lever with her knee. The pain and
therefrom. An 'occupational disease' shall also include damage or harm to the
physical structure of the body occurring as the result of repetitious physical
traumatic activities extending over a period of time and arising in the course of
employment; provided, that the date of the cumulative injury shall be the date
disability was caused thereby. Ordinary diseases of life to which the general
public is exposed outside of the employment shall not be compensable, except
where such diseases follow as an incident to an 'Occupational Disease' or 'Injury'
as defined in this Section.
116. Employers Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Schmidt, 509 S.W.2d 398 (Tex. Civ. App.Eastland), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 516 S.W.2d 117 (Tex. 1974), reviewed in Sartwelle, supra
note I, at 193-94.
117. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Luker, 511 S.W.2d 587 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co. v. Hollis, 511 S.W.2d 583 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Murphy, 506
S.W.2d 312 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1974, no writ); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Rowan,
499 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Two other opinions have cited
amended section 20 but held it was not applicable because the case under consideration arose
prior to the effective date of the statute. Haley v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 487 S.W.2d 369
(Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Legate v. Bituminous Fire & Marine Ins.
Co., 483 S.W.2d 488 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
118. For example, one writer has advanced the contention that mentally induced occupational
diseases, i.e., high blood pressure as a result of job tension, heart attack as a result of job
pressures and frustrations, are compensable under amended section 20. Terry, Occupational
Disease and Cumulative Injury, 8 TRIAL LAW. F., April-June 1974, at 3. The occupational disease
opinions since the 1971 amendment as well as some of the interpretation problems are discussed
and reviewed in Sartwelle, supra note 1, at 183-97.
119. 537 S.W.2d 355 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, no writ).
120. The fact that the prior injury was compensable is significant because of TEX. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 22 (Vernon 1967). Section 22 provides for a reduction in compensation
when an occupational disease is aggravated by a noncompensable disease or infirmity or when
incapacity or death from a noncompensable cause is aggravated, prolonged, accelerated or in any
manner contributed to by an occupational disease.
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swelling became acute in March and April 1974, and shortly thereafter she
underwent a third knee operation. The employee's doctor testified that the
repetitious physical trauma caused by pressing the knee against the sewing
machine lever necessitated the third operation. According to the physician's
testimony, the claimant's knee was deteriorating rapidly and permanently
disabled her from performing the type of activities required in her employment. The trial court submitted special issues which inquired whether the
claimant suffered an injury to her right knee during March and April 1974.
Injury was defined in terms of section 20:
[Injury means] damage or harm to the physical structure of the body
occurring as a result of repetitious physical traumatic activities extending
over a period of time and such disease or infection as naturally result
therefrom or the incitement, acceleration, or aggravation of any disease,
infirmity, or condition, previously or subsequently existing, by reason of
such damage or harm."'
On appeal the carrier contended that the trial court failed to submit the
statutory definitions of injury, accidental injury, and occupational disease.
The carrier also argued that the first issue only inquired whether plaintiff
injured her knee in March and April 1974, and that this was "not definite in
nature and did not inquire as to a date certain."' 122 The court properly
overruled these contentions, holding that the pleadings and proof demonstrated an injury caused by repetitious physical traumatic activities, which
was the precise question submitted to the jury by the injury definition. 123 With
respect to the "date certain" argument advanced by the carrier, the court
simply held that occupational disease is an exception to the specificity and
there was no necestracing requirements of accidental injury and, 1therefore,
24
sity for a finding of any specific injury date.
Mueller v. CharterOak Fire Insurance Co. 125 was a heart attack death case
wherein the wife beneficiary appealed a take nothing judgment rendered on a
121. 537 S.W.2d at 359; see note 115 supra.
122. Id. at 360. This contention is obscure at best. The claimant's pleading and proof were
apparently limited to repetitious physical traumatic activity which must, by definition, occur over
a period of time (whatever that may mean). The court may have misstated or misconstrued the
contention. The carrier may have been contending that the jury was not required to determine the
date of "cumulative injury," which section 20 defines as the date disability is caused by the
repetitious physical traumatic activity. The "cumulative injury" provision may well have
implications in the area of the claimant's good cause for failing timely to notify the employer of
the injury and to file a claim for compensation with the Industrial Accident Board. Employers
Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Schmidt, 509 S.W.2d 398 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland), writ ref'd
n.r.e. per curiam, 516 S.W.2d 117 (Tex. 1974).
123. 537 S.W.2d at 360, citing Employers Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Schmidt, 509 S.W.2d
398 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 516 S.W.2d 117 (Tex. 1974).
124. 537 S.W.2d at 360, citing Olson v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 477 S.W.2d 859
(Tex. 1972); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Contreras, 498 S.W.2d 419 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.). This holding is contrary to a statement made by
the court of civil appeals in Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co. v. Hollis, 511 S.W.2d 583, 584 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.), wherein the court said: "[Ilt is no longer
necessary to allege and prove either an event traceable to a definite time, place and cause or a
listed compensable occupational disease." The last part of the quoted statement is clearly correct
under amended § 20. The former portion of the quoted statement, however, is incorrect if
interpreted to mean that no distinction is to be made under the amended statute between
accidental injury and occupational disease. The long-recognized distinction between accidental
injury and occupational disease does still exist as held by the Ratcliffcourt. See Sartwelle, supra
note 1, at 183-90.
125. 533 S.W.2d 123 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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jury finding that the deceased did not suffer a heart attack in the course and
scope of his employment. Among the wife's contentions was that the employee's heart attack was caused by overexertion or strain or by repetitious
physical traumatic activities extending over an eleven-year period of time.
The claimant relied upon testimony elicited from the carrier's medical expert,
which testimony was quoted by the court in the opinion. The court held that
the clause in section 20 excluding ordinary diseases of life indicated a
legislative intent to require evidence of the causal connection between the
employment and the occupational disease. The evidence, however, failed to
establish that cumulative strain in operating a lathe for eleven years caused or
contributed to cause the heart attack. The court also held that the jury's
negative finding was not against the great weight and preponderance of the
evidence.
The general discussion in Ratcliff and the comment in Mueller concerning
the legislative intent to require evidence of causal connection between the
employment and the occupational disease are significant even though the
courts may not have been aware of the specific import of the comments.
These two opinions illustrate the principal component in the occupational
disease definition: the distinction not between accidental injury and occupational disease, because both are compensable, but the distinction between
occupational diseases and diseases that are neither accidental126 nor occupational but common to human beings in general and not normally associated
with employment. Ratcliff, without discussion but properly it seems, concluded that the claimant's particular disease, repetitive trauma to the knee,
was not an ordinary disease of life, while Muellerrejected the contention that
heart disease, in that particular fact situation, was peculiar to the employment. The inquiry raised by these two opinions is as follows: Under section
20's general definition of occupational disease where is the boundary between
compensable diseases and diseases of everyday life? Section 20 provides
compensation for any disease arising out of the course of employment which
causes damage or harm to the physical structures of the body, including
repetitious physical traumatic activity, but excludes "[o]rdinary diseases of
life to which the general public is exposed outside of the employment...
except where such diseases follow as an incident to an 'occupational disease'
or 'injury' . .
127
Professor Larson notes that most states that have a general occupational
disease definition also have a common element provision which excludes
diseases which might as readily be contracted in everyday life (section 20) and
diseases common to other occupations.1 28 Larson points out, however, that
the distinction between occupational and nonemployment exposures is of no
significance since the infinite variety of occupational conditions does not
126. If a disease is traceable to a specific event, it becomes an accidental injury. See, e.g.,
Guthrie v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 146 Tex. 89, 203 S.W.2d 775 (1947); Consolidated
Underwriters v. Wright, 408 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Robison, 241 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1951, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Wade, 197 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston
1946, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
127. See note 115 supra.
128. IA A. LARSON,THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 41.32-.33 (1973).
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supply a common element for determining what is ordinary and what is
distinctively occupational in a particular employment. 2 9 Thus, occupational
conditions may be distinctive merely because familiar harmful elements are
present in unusual degree. 310 For example, contraction of rheumatoid arthritis
has been held occupational where it was the result of continual handling of ice
and iced produce by a wholesale market employee.'13
Judicial interpretation of the terms "everyday life" and "employment in
other occupations" has produced only rather shadowy guidelines for defining
occupational disease exclusions. 132 Further, some courts have shown a
disposition to expand the definition of occupational disease to its broadest
extent, defining disease as any "serious derangement of health" or "disordered state of an organism or organ."1133 Back strain and flat feet, for example,
have been held compensable as occupational diseases when3 4produced or
aggravated by the distinctive conditions of the employment.
Thus, it is apparent that Texas, after six years of an occupational disease
definition, has not yet confronted the difficult and perplexing problem of legal
line-drawing. It is hoped that our courts will consider the experiences of other
states and attempt to formulate a reasonable, workable, practical guideline
for occupational diseases.
Occupational Disease-Limitations. An extremely well-considered, articulate opinion which is probably of note only on a historical basis was
rendered by the Houston (First District) court of civil appeals in Brantley v.
Phoenix InsuranceCo. 135The decision, written by Justice Evans, involved an
interpretation of section 25 of article 8306136 which was repealed by the 1971
amendments. That section provided, in part, that a carrier was not liable for
the occupational disease of silicosis or asbestosis three years after the
employee's last injurious exposure to such disease in his employment. 137The
employee alleged that he had been employed by the defendant from December 1961 through October 1962 and that this had been his only exposure to
asbestos. The employee was forced to terminate all employment in September 1973. He underwent lung surgery in March 1974 for a malignant lung
tumor which was diagnosed as having been caused by his exposure to
asbestos. It was stipulated that the employee's last injurious exposure
occurred in 1962 and that the claimant's incapacity from the exposure did not
occur within three years of his last exposure. It was further stipulated that the
first distinct manifestation of asbestosis and incapacity occurred after August
30, 1971 (the date section 25 was repealed).
The trial court granted the carrier's motion for summary judgment. On
appeal the claimant contended that since his disability did not occur until
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. § 41.33, at 7-267.
Id. at 7-271.
Id.
See id. §§ 41.33-.50 for a compilation of decisions from various states.
Id. § 41.40, at 7-278 to -279.
Id.
536 S.W.2d 72 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, writ ref'd).
1947 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 113, § 7,at 178 (repealed 1971).
Id.
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1973, after the occupational disease definition became effective, his cumulative injury would not be barred by the repealed section 25. The court refused
the claimant's argument, holding that the 1971 amendments' 38 reflected the
legislative intent that the amended laws would not affect pre-existing rights or
remedies and that to revive a cause of action which had already been barred
would be unconstitutional. 39 Thus, the trial court's determination that the
claimant's cause of action was barred by section 25 was affirmed, and the
supreme court refused a writ of error.1 40
OccupationalDisease-FirstDistinctManifestation. To perfect a claim for
an occupational disease, the Compensation Act provides that an employee
must notify his employer within thirty days and file a claim with the Industrial
Accident Board within six months after the first distinct manifestation of the
occupational disease.' 14 Amazingly, prior to the 1974 survey year only one
Texas case had interpreted the phrase "first distinct manifestation."1 42 In the
1974 survey year two courts considered the issue. One court 43 did not directly
interpret the phrase, but the other specifically discussed the phrase and the
evidence necessary to uphold a jury finding in favor of the claimant.'"
Unfortunately, although the Texarkana court of civil appeals was specifically
confronted with the issue of first distinct manifestation in English v. American & Foreign Insurance Co. ,145 the court did not cite or discuss any of the
three prior opinions on first distinct manifestation. The claimant attacked the
jury's finding on first distinct manifestation, complaining that the answer was
against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. The court simply
reviewed the evidence and held that the jury's answer was not against the
great weight of the evidence.'46
Second Injury Fund-Priorand Subsequent Injuries. Prior to September 1,
1971, section 12c of article 8306147 provided the insurer the defense of
percentage contribution of prior compensable injuries to a present incapacity.
The 1971 amendment of section 12c 148 destroyed this defense by providing
that "the Association shall be liable for all compensation provided by this
Act.' 49 The first case to interpret the new section 12c was Texas Employers'
InsuranceAss 'n v. Creswell, 5 ° wherein the court simply held that "proof of a
prior compensable injury will no longer reduce recovery of a workman
138. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306 (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
139. 536 S.W.2d at 74.
140. Brantley v. Phoenix Insurance Co., 20 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 17 (Oct. 20, 1976).
141. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 4a (Vernon 1967).
142. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Miller, 390 S.W.2d 284 (Tex. Civ. App.-EI Paso 1965, no writ).
143. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Rowan, 499 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1973, writ ref'd
n.r.e.), reviewed in Sartwelle, supra note i, at 194-95.
144. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Luker, 511 S.W.2d 587 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.), reviewed in Sartwelle, supra note 1, at 194-97.
145. 529 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1975, no writ).
146.

Id. at 814.

147. 1947 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 349, § 1, at 690 (repealed 1971).
148. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 12c (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
149. Id. (emphasis added).
150. 511 S.W.2d 68 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.), reviewedin Sartwelle,
supra note 1,at 197.
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because of such prior injury."' 5 1 The next year the Amarillo court of civil
appeals, in Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n v. Haunschild,5 2 in a
thorough, persuasive opinion which contains an excellent discussion of the
history of section 12c reached the same conclusion as the Creswell court.
Neither court, however, decided whether the amendment to section 12c-1' "
entitled the carrier to be reimbursed from the Second Injury Fund for liability
resulting from multiple general injuries as well as multiple specific injuries
causing total and permanent incapacity.
That question was answered by two courts during this survey year. In
Houston GeneralInsuranceCo. v. Teague'54 the carrier and employee entered
into a fact stipulation wherein it was agreed that the employee suffered a
general injury to his back on December 10, 1973, and as a result thereof
suffered total and permanent incapacity. It was further stipulated that the
claimant suffered a prior compensable general injury on August 26, 1971,
which required disc surgery, and also suffered another general injury on
November 30, 1972, requiring disc surgery. As a result of the two injuries, it
was stipulated that the employee suffered a total of thirty percent permanent
disability. The trial court awarded total and permanent benefits but denied the
carrier a thirty percent credit on the judgment for the employee's two prior
compensable injuries. In so holding, the trial court found that the carrier was
not entitled to reimbursement from the Second Injury Fund.'
On appeal the Waco court of civil appeals followed the Creswell and
Haunschild opinions and held that "proof of a prior compensable injury will
56
no longer reduce the recovery of a workman because of such prior injury."'1
As to the carrier's second point, that it was entitled to reimbursement from
the Second Injury Fund, the court noted the supreme court's decision in
Second Injury Fund v. Keaton 57 wherein the court held, under the wording of
prior section 12c, that the liability of the Second Injury Fund was limited to
situations involving a combination of specific injuries resulting in total and
permanent incapacity. The supreme court specifically held that combinations
of general injuries are not compensable from the Second Injury Fund. Thus,
the Waco court held, on the authority of Keaton, that the carrier could not
recover from the Second Injury Fund.
In Second Injury Fund v. American Motorists Insurance Co. 158 the facts
were again stipulated. The employee was found to be totally and permanently
disabled, but it was also stipulated that a previous back injury in 1965
contributed fifty percent to his present incapacity. On appeal the Eastland
court of civil appeals carefully compared the language of prior section 12c
with the amended section 12c. 159 Relying upon the supreme court's opinion in
151. 511 S.W.2d at 69.
152. 527 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.), reviewedin Sartwelle,
supra note 3, at 237-39.
153. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 12c-I (Vernon Supp. 1976-77); see Sartwelle,
supra note 1, at 197 n.90; Sartwelle, supra note 3, at 238 n.152.
154. 531 S.W.2d 457 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
155. See note 153 supra. The Second Injury Fund was a third-party defendant.
156. 531 S.W.2d at 459.
157. 162 Tex. 250, 345 S.W.2d 711 (1961).
158. 541 S.W.2d 514 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1976, writ filed).
159. Id. at 515. The court quotes the full text of both statutes.
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Keaton, the court rejected the carrier's contention that it was entitled to
reimbursement from the Second Injury Fund for a combination of general
injuries. In so doing the court rejected the carrier's argument that the purpose
of the Second Injury Fund would be totally frustrated if the carrier was not
permitted a reduction or reimbursement for prior compensable injuries,
stating that the matter should be addressed to the legislature and not the
courts. 160
A very interesting and instructive opinion involving the admissibility of
prior compensable and noncompensable injuries was rendered by the Tyler
court of civil appeals in Mayfield v. Employers Reinsurance Corp.' 61 The
employee claimed to have had an accident on July 24, 1973, in which a stack of
boxes fell on him, injuring his back. The carrier disputed the alleged accident.
A co-employeee testified he was working with the claimant but d; J not
observe or hear any of the fifty-pound boxes fall. Two physicians testified,
one concluding that the claimant was not injured, the other testifying to
subjective symptoms only but admitting that his opinion that the injuries were
caused by the accident was based solely on the claimant's history. The jury
found that the claimant did not suffer an accidental injury as alleged. On
appeal the claimant contended that the trial court erred in admitting evidence
of eleven prior back injuries, seven of which were compensable on-the-job
back injuries. The claimant argued that such evidence was inadmissible until
the carrier first produced medical testimony that the employee's present
incapacity was caused solely by the prior injuries.
The Tyler court rejected this argument, affirming the trial court's take
nothing judgment. The court noted the Haunschild opinion, agreeing that
after 1971 proof of prior injuries was limited to the issue of whether the prior
injuries were the sole cause of the employee's present incapacity. With
respect to the claimant's argument that a medical predicate must be established before prior injuries are admissible, the court distinguished between
requiring a predicate for such evidence and showing the purpose for which the
evidence is offered. Finding that "[t]he establishment of any causal relationship between other injuries and present incapacity would be extremely
difficult without some reference to or evidence of those injuries," 162 the court
rejected the claimant's contention.
The employee's second attack was upon the trial court's admission into
evidence of copies of notices of injuries which the employee filed with the
Industrial Accident Board. The employee objected to the documents on the
basis of irrelevancy. The six documents introduced into evidence contained
descriptions of each accident and of the claimant's alleged injuries. The court
held that the irrelevancy objection was a general objection which did not
preserve any error. Conceding that the claimant's real objection was that the
documents had no bearing on whether the present injury caused the present
incapacity, the court nevertheless overruled the claimant's contention, holding that "[e]vidence of other injuries is admissible if it might have some
160.

Id. at 516.

161.
162.

539 S.W.2d 398 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
Id. at 399.
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the injury sued on is the producing cause
bearing on the question of whether
1 63
of any incapacity claimed.'
The court also overruled the claimant's hearsay objection to the notices of
injury, holding that the claimant failed to make that objection in the trial court
and thereby waived any error. The court then turned to the claimant's
contention that the trial court erred in admitting testimony showing the fact
and amount of three prior compensation settlements. The testimony revealed
that the employee settled an August 1974 injury for $850, a May 1973 injury
for $750, and a February 1973 injury for $1,400. The jury was instructed to
consider that evidence only on the lump sum issue. Overruling the claimant's
contention, the court of civil appeals held that evidence of other settlements
recently received by a compensation claimant is admissible when the claimant
seeks a lump sum recovery on grounds of hardship." 6 The court specifically
noted that the evidence of settlements was limited to those amounts received
within three years of trial.
The claimant's final evidentiary contention was that evidence of other
injuries occuring on the job did not have any bearing on whether the injury
sued on was the cause of the alleged incapacity and that evidence that some of
the prior injuries occurred on the job prejudiced the claimant in the jury's
mind. The court specifically rejected this argument. Since the jury was aware
through other admissible evidence of eleven prior similar injuries to the
employee, the court concluded that evidence that seven of these injuries
occurred on the job did not so prejudice the jury as to result in an improper
judgment. 165
The Mayfield court, in reaching its holdings, relied upon the supreme
court's opinion in Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. McCardell.'6
Although McCardell was decided prior to the 1971 Second Injury Fund
amendment, the court's holding is still applicable to the only remaining prior
injury defense: sole cause. The McCardelltrial judge admitted into evidence,
over objections, petitions, notices of injury, and claims for compensation, as
well as affidavits filed with trial courts and the Industrial Accident Board in
connection with five prior injuries suffered by the employee. Justice Hamilton, writing for the supreme court, determined that the well settled rules of
evidence should govern the admissiblity of these types of evidence. Holding
that the evidence was hearsay and prejudicial, the court suggested that the
evidence might nevertheless be admissible as an admission of a party against
67
his interest. 1
163. Id. at 400-01 (emphasis in original).
164. Id. at 401, citing Jones v. Travelers Ins. Co., 374 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. Civ. App.Beaumont 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.); General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Co. v. Coffman, 326
S.W.2d 287 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
165. 539 S.W.2d at 401.
166. 369 S.W.2d 331 (Tex. 1963) (opinion by Hamilton, J., joined by Calvert, C.J., Culver, J.,
and Norvell, J.; concurring opinion by Smith, J., joined by Greenhill, J., Steakley, J., and
Walker, J.; Griffin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
167. Id. at 337. The court defined an admission used in this sense as "any statement made or
act done by one of the parties to any action or on his behalf which amounts to a prior
acknowledgement by such party that one of the facts relevant to the issues is not as he now
claims." Id.
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The supreme court then went on to analyze each of the documents placed in
evidence, finding that some of the documents were indeed admissible because they did impeach the employee's testimony and were an admission
against interest, but holding that others were improperly admitted because
they were not inconsistent with the claimant's testimony.
While the McCardell opinion may be distinguished from cases arising after
the 1971 amendments, such as Mayfield, on the basis that the prior injuries
were admissible to reduce the carrier's liability for the present incapacity, it is
submitted that the court's reasoning in McCardell is still valid today on the
sole cause issue. Obviously, the prior injuries must be relevant in the sense of
their affecting the same portion of the body, and the trial court should also be
concerned that the injury is not too remote in time. The amount of settlements
or verdicts obtained from the prior injuries should not be admissible as a part
of the proof on sole cause 68 but would be admissible, if not remote, on the
69
issue of lump sum payment.1
At first glance Mayfield may be looked upon as a blow to a claimant's
recovery of compensation benefits, especially if the claimant has several
prior injuries to the same part of the body involved in the present incapacity
claim. Practically and tactically, however, Mayfield will have little impact on
the average compensation claim. In the first place, one, two, or even three
prior back claims are usually not significant unless the claimant is very young
and not yet into the degenerative disc disease syndrome. Second, almost
every claimant will readily testify that he recovered from the injury without
any sequela. This testimony is easily substantiated by showing a good work
record after the injury. More importantly, however, because the definitions
of injury' 7 ° and producing cause '7" allow full compensation for aggravation of
172
a pre-existing condition, except possibly in occupational disease cases,
convincing a jury to answer a sole cause issue favorably will be as frustrating
as attempting to sell ice to the Eskimos. Proof of prior injuries under a sole
cause pleading may result in the jury unconsciously deducting a few weeks of
disability because the claimant received money for the other injury, but it
could also make a jury believe that the claimant's back was weakened by the
prior injuries and, therefore, was more susceptible to permanent injury with
moderate or minimal trauma. In other words, prior injuries can frequently
turn into double-edge swords.
Injury in the Course of Employment-Heart Attacks and Strokes. Perhaps
the most difficult area of compensation law is the compensability of heart
168.

Id. at 343; St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Murphree, 163 Tex. 534, 357 S.W.2d 744

(1962); Myers v. Thomas, 143 Tex. 502, 186 S.W.2d 811 (1945).

169. See note 164 supra and accompanying text.
170. "Injury means damage or harm to the physical structure of the body and such diseases or
infection as naturally result therefrom, or the incitement, acceleration, or aggravation of any
disease, infirmity, or condition, previously or subsequently existing, by reason of such damage or
harm." 2 STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES § 20.01 (1970).
171. "Producing cause means an injury or condition which, either independently or together
with one or more other injuries or conditions, results in incapacity, and without which such
incapacity would not have occurred when it did." 2 STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS PATTERN JURY
CHARGES § 22.01 (1970).

172. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 22 (Vernon 1967); see Texas Employers' Ins.
Ass'n v. Etheredge, 154 Tex. I, 272 S.W.2d 869 (1954); Sartwelle, supra note I, at 183-88.
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attacks and strokes. The prime difficulty is the artificial court-made limitation
applicable only to heart attack and stroke cases; strain and overexertion' 73 is a
limitation which distinguishes heart attack and stroke cases from all other
physical injuries compensable under the Compensation Act. There is nothing
in the compensation statute designating heart attacks or strokes to be compensable only if they result from strain and overexertion; the requirement is
purely a creature of the courts. When combined with evidence problems
associated with death cases as well as medical causation disputes, the strain
and overexertion fiat adds up to perplexing and difficult problems. The result
is a large number of inconsistent and ludicrous appellate opinions which
further confuse an area of compensation law desperately in need of consistency.
Last year the Corpus Christi court of civil appeals added to the confusion in
this area with their opinion in Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Thurmond. 174 This year a divided supreme court added another opinion to the
heart attack area in Henderson v. Travelers Insurance Co. 175 The court's
majority and concurring opinions, however, did absolutely nothing to harmonize the existing problems in this area.
The deceased employee, Owen Henderson, was employed at the Texaco
Port Arthur Refinery as an air hoist operator. He died at the refinery of a heart
attack on January 16, 1973, soon after completing his regular eight-hour work
shift. Henderson's job as an air hoist operator was to operate and control a
mechanical winch powered by pressurized air. The air hoist was used to raise
and lower materials and equipment to employees working on various levels of
buildings or units under repair. Henderson remained at the air hoist controls
at the bottom of the structure.
It is important to note that Henderson reached the supreme court as an
instructed verdict case, thereby invoking a predetermined analysis of the
evidence to determine whether there was any evidence of probative force to
raise a fact issue.1 76 Thus, the court was restricted to considering only that
evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom in the most favorable light
supporting the beneficiary's position, disregarding all contrary evidence and
inferences. 177 The Beaumont court of civil appeals, 7s reviewing the trial
court's instructed verdict at the close of the beneficiary's case, also viewed
the evidence in the light most favorable to the beneficiary 7 9 but concluded, as
did the trial court, that there was no evidence, either direct or circumstantial,
that raised a fact issue as to whether the deceased suffered any job related
strain and exertion which produced his heart attack.'80 The supreme court,
173. See, e.g., Baird v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 495 S.W.2d 207 (Tex. 1973); Olson v.
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 477 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. 1972).
174.

527 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.). This particular

opinion as well as the Texas strain and overexertion requirement are analyzed and criticized at
length, and a solution proposed, in Sartwelle, supra note 3, at 243-53.
175. 20 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 84 (Dec. 1, 1976).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Henderson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 533 S.W.2d 407 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976, writ
granted).
179. Id. at 408.
180. Id.
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with two justices concurring in the result'

and two dissenting, 182 reversed the

lower courts' judgments and remanded the case to the district court for
trial. 183
Although it was established that the deceased was on his employer's

premises at 7:30 a.m., no one testified that he actually saw the decedent
performing his job duties during the eight hours preceding his heart attack.
The only evidence indicating that the deceased worked on the day in question
was his supervisor's testimony that his assigned job was air hoist operator.
Evidence of the duties of an air hoist operator was supplied by a co-worker

who admitted that he had not worked with the deceased on the day in question
and had no first-hand knowledge of what the decedent actually did on that
day. The co-worker further admitted that he could not say for sure that he had
ever worked on the particular unit where the decedent was supposedly

working on January 16, 1973. His entire testimony was based upon the
assumption that the decedent was operating the air hoist by himself when
normally two people were assigned to the air hoist. With that assumption, the

co-employee testified that operating an air hoist was a physically strenuous
and demanding job. The co-employee further testified that air hoist operators
were normally under mental stress and strain because they worked the
machinery in close proximity to other employees and could, if they made the
wrong move, cause an accident. The physically demanding part of the job,
according to the co-employee, was pulling cable and keeping the cable

straight. Based upon the quoted portions of the co-employee's deposition, the
majority concluded that there was at least some evidence which raised a fact
issue as to whether the deceased suffered "any strain or exertion while at
work."184

The majority then turned to an analysis of the medical testimony on
producing cause. The pathologist performing the autopsy testified that the
decedent had an enlarged left ventricle, indicating the probability of hypertension. The doctor assumed that the decedent had a borderline blood supply
181. Henderson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 544 S.W.2d 649,655 (Tex. 1976) (concurring opinion by
Reavley, J., joined by Steakley, J.).
182. Id. at 655, 659 (dissenting opinion by Greenhill, C.J., joined by Denton, J.).
183. The remand of this case illustrates a situation hypothesized by former Chief Justice
Calvert when writing about the consideration of no evidence points of error by the appellate
courts:
The rule as generally stated is that if reasonable minds cannot differ from the
conclusion that the evidence lacks probative force it will be held to be the legal
equivalent of no evidence. The application of the rule can lead to strange results.
It is theoretically possible, and sometimes not far from actual fact, that five
members of the Supreme Court will conclude that the evidence supporting a
finding of a vital fact has no probative force, and in reaching the conclusion
through application of the rule will thus hold, in effect, that the trial judge who
overruled a motion for instructed verdict, the twelve jurors who found the
existence of the vital fact, the three justices of the Court of Civil Appeals who
overruled a 'no evidence' point of error and four dissenting justices of the
Supreme Court are not men of 'reasonable minds.'
Calvert, "No Evidence" and "Insufficient Evidence"Points ofError,38TEXAsL. REV. 361,364
(1960). In Henderson, seven supreme court justices decided that reasonable minds could differ
on the evidence presented, while the trial court, three court of civil appeals judges, and two
supreme court justices decided that reasonable minds could not differ. Perhaps the courts should
devise another test of the evidence to avoid the stigma of holding that their colleagues are men of
"unreasonable minds."
184. 544 S.W.2d at 652.
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to the coronary arteries, apparently because of atherosclerotic plack buildup,
and that the physical exertion of the decedent creatd the need for additional
oxygen in the myocardium. This oxygen could not reach the heart because of
the occlusion, and a cardiac arrythmia resulted, which further reduced the
blood flow to the heart muscle and other vital organs to cause death." 5
A cardiologist also testified. The portion of the cardiologist's testimony
quoted by the majority contains the hypothetical question asked by this
doctor. The question required the doctor to assume that "operating the air
hoist and greasingthe bolts were things which did not involve great physical
stress, but did involve a moderate amount of physical movement or moving
around."'18 6 In this doctor's opinion the physical activity could have been a
producing cause of death. The opinion does not explain, however, what is
meant by "greasing the bolts." In any event, the majority held that the two
doctors' testimony was "some evidence that the heart attack was caused by
87
Henderson's strenuous work on the day of his death.'
At first glance, it may appear that the majority opinion indicates a possible
change in the court-made strain-overexertion doctrine applied to heart attacks and strokes. This does not appear to be the case, albeit the opinion is not
well written nor is the justification for the result well conceived in factual
support from the record. These criticisms are ably articulated in the very
precise and cogent dissenting opinion offered by Chief Justice Greenhill
joined by Justice Denton. The chief justice quickly isolated the majority's
actual holding, thereby severely limiting the sweep of the majority opinion.
The chief justice wrote: "What we have in this case is a job description,-the
type of work the man did, and testimony of the job description that the work
could be strenuous, plus some testimony, later discussed, that the job was
8
strenuous."
Chief Justice Greenhill then reviewed prior heart attack and stroke opinions wherein evidence amounting to a general job description was found
insufficient to prove actualstrainand overexertion causing the heart attack or
stroke.' 89 He also discussed two opinions wherein circumstantial evidence of
185. The doctor's testimony is quoted, in part, id. at 653. The quotation used by the majority,
however, is apparently taken out of context because it refers to "thrombus" and "occlusion"
while there is nothing quoted indicating that a thrombus was found at autopsy or that any of the
coronary arteries were occluded by atherosclerotic plack. One can only assume that there must
have been some evidence of thrombus formation or atherosclerotic plack formation. Cardiac
arrhythmias are thought to arise from a number of causes, including underlying atherosclerosis,
but many of the causes of arrhythmias are not necessarily thought to be related to underlying
heart disease but rather to other unrelated factors, many seemingly congenital in nature. See
HARRISON'S PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 1142-54 (6th ed. 1970); E. SAGALL & B. REED,
THE HEART AND THE LAW 527-38 (1968).
186. 544 S.W.2d at 653 (emphasis added).
187.

Id.

188. Id. at 656 (dissenting opinion) (emphasis in original).
189. Id. at 656, citing and discussing Whitaker v. General Ins. Co., 461 S.W.2d 148 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.); O'Dell v. Home Indem. Co., 449 S.W.2d 485 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Smith, 448 S.W.2d 541 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Monks v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 425 S.W.2d
431 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Bean v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co., 349 S.W.2d
284 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.); General Accident Fire & Life Assurance
Corp. v. Perry, 264 S.W.2d 198 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1954, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Houston Fire
& Cas. Ins. Co. v. Biber, 146 S.W.2d 442 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1940, writ dism'd jdgmt
cor.).
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strain and overexertion was held sufficient to sustain recovery,19 0 but as the
chief justice pointed out, each case required evidence of the oft repeated
minimum criteria for recovery in heart attack and stroke cases: direct
job-related strain and overexertion. 191 In Henderson, the chief justice observed, there was no evidence of any work activities performed by the
decedent on the day of the attack. 92 Instead, the plaintiff relied upon
"testimony consisting of a general job description to indicate the possibility
of job related activities resulting in strain or exertion."' 93
The dissent proceeded to point out quite clearly that none of the claimant's
witnesses had any personal knowledge of the decedent's work activities on
the day in question other than decedent's supervisor, who could only say that
he saw and spoke to the decedent at the beginning of the work day but did not
see him thereafter. 94 Moreover, the air hoist operator testifying at trial
regarding strain and exertion based his testimony on the assumption that the
deceased operated the hoist by himself. There was no proof of this fact. 95 In
Chief Justice Greenhill's opinion, the court went "as far as the [c]ourt should
go"" in Baird v. Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n, 197 wherein recovery
was upheld because although the actual work performed by the employee was
not particularly strenuous in comparison to most physical labor jobs, the
employee was performing tasks which he did not customarily perform. The
chief justice concluded his dissent as follows:
As stated, the possibility of strain or exertion is present in all types of
employment especially those jobs involving some element of manual
labor. If proof that one's job may, or even usually does involve some
manual labor, or may be strenuous, is sufficient to establish particular
strain or overexertion for recovery under the Workmen's Compensation
Laws, then we really have turned this legislation into health insurance.
Health insurance may be highly desirable, but the Legislature has not
provided for it.' 98
It is submitted that a close reading of the majority and dissenting opinions
reveals that there is not yet any change in the strain-overexertion requirement
for heart attack and stroke cases. The majority opinion begins by citing, with
apparent approval, Baird v. Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n 9 and
Whitaker v. GeneralInsurance Co. 200 Whitaker was strongly relied upon by
the carrier in Henderson because of its forceful language favorable to carriers
in heart attack and stroke cases. The majority later distinguished Whitaker as
190. 544 S. W2d at 657, citing and discussing Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v. Wesbrooks, 511
S.W.2d 406 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ); Continental Ins. Co. v. Marshall, 506
S.W.2d 913 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1974, no writ).
191. See, e.g., Baird v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 495 S.W.2d 207 (Tex. 1973); Olson v.
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 477 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. 1972); O'Dell v. Home Indem. Co., 449
S.W.2d 485 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Bean v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co.,
349 S.W.2d 284 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Texas Employers' Ins.
Ass'n v. Talmadge, 256 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1953, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
192. 544 S.W.2d at 658 (dissenting opinion) (emphasis in original).
193. Id. (emphasis in original).
194. Id.at 658.
195. Id.
1%. Id. at 657.
197. 495 S.W.2d 207 (Tex. 1973).
198. 544 S.W.2d at 658.
199. 495 S.W.2d 207 (Tex. 1973).
200. 461 S.W.2d 148 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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being "substantially different from the situation presently before US"1 20'
because in that case a witness testified affirmatively that the deceased
performed no strenuous work and because the medical testimony was
equivocal at best and was based on evidence not in the record. 212 Citing the
difficulty in such cases in determining whether the circumstantial evidence
and allowable inferences present issuable facts, the majority concluded that
"given this record, we cannot say that the evidence offered to prove the vital
facts is so weak as to do no more than create a mere surmise or suspicion of
' 20 3
their existence.
Thus, it is evident that the majority and dissenting justices simply parted
ways over the imprecise rule which is used to measure the probative force of
evidence and decide whether questions of fact are raised by such evidence;
that is, can reasonable minds differ?20 4 Apparently, reasonable minds did
differ when confronted with the facts in Henderson: the supreme court
majority and concurring justices versus the two dissenting justices, the trial
judge, and the three court of civil appeals judges, or seven reasonable minds
versus six unreasonable minds.20 5
The concurring opinion in Henderson, 20 however, provides reason to be
concerned that heart attack and stroke cases may become compensable
anytime they occur on the employer's premises or anytime a doctor may
flippantly testify that the employment activities produced or precipitated the
incident. Regarding the proof requried to sustain recovery, the concurring
justices declared:
At [sic] heart attack precipitated or brought on by the activity of the
job is an injury sustained in the course of employment. A claimant must
prove activity and then prove that the activity was a cause of this
particular attack or injury. The proof cannot stop at possibility-nor
need it reach certainty; it is enough to prove the probability. The
claimant need only produce evidence and obtain findings that it is more
likely than not that the workman's
2 7 activity at his work overstrained his
heart and precipitated his death.
These statements clearly portend cradle to grave heart attack and stroke
insurance20 8 with or without legislative approval. Consider the concluding
paragraph in the concurring opinion:
I believe that a jury could find that Henderson's body was subjected to
strain by this day's work. It is not a question of presumption-or
presumption upon presumption. It is simply that evidence that Henderson successfully completed this day's work, together with evidence of
what his job required, reasonably support the conclusion that Henderson
probably did tire and strain his diseased heart until the deadly attack

occurred

209

201. 544 S.W.2d at 654 (emphasis added).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. See Calvert, supra note 183.
205. Id.
206. 544 S.W.2d at 654-55 (concurring opinion by Reavley, J., joined by Steakley, J.).
207. Id.
208. Id. at 655 (dissenting opinion by Greenhill, C. J.). Seealso Olson v. Hartford Accident &
Indem. Co., 477 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. 1972); Houston Fire & Cas. Co. v. Biber, 146 S.W.2d 442 (Tex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio 1940, writ dism'd jdgmt cor.).
209. 544 S.W.2d at 655 (emphasis added).

1977]

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

It is almost impossible to comprehend the full ramifications of these
ubiquitous statements and absurd conclusions. To say that evidence of the
job requirements coupled with evidence that the employee completed a work
day is sufficient to compel compensation is tantamount to holding that an
employee only need appear on the employer's premises in order to be insured
against any medical eventuality that may befall him that day. Moreover, the
concurring opinion vividly illustrates the serious lack of knowledge common
to most judges regarding the causes of heart attacks, an ignorance which has
spawned the ill-considered doctrines applicable to heart attacks in compensation suits. 2t 0 Carried to its logical conclusion, the concurring justices' thesis
would compensate any employee engaged in physical21 work and deny
compensation to an office worker who merely sits and adds columns of
figures day after day. Regardless of this illogical result, however, the important aspect of the concurring opinion is its adoption of the myth of physical
strain as a cause or aggravating factor in heart attacks.
Physical strain as a cause or precipitating factor in heart attacks has been
studied by the American Heart Association for years. The Association's
Committee on the effects of strain and trauma on the heart and great vessels
published its report 212 in 1962. Contrary to popular belief, and the belief of
some uninformed physicians,2" 3 the Committee concluded that there was no
valid scientific, medical evidence demonstratinga connection between physical effort and myocardialinfarction.214 One Committee member expressed a
rather disturbing view:
Public opinion, and not medical opinion, is now the deciding influence
in this field. All of this makes the finely drawn medical distinctions of
cardiac impairment quite futile insofar as their influence on legal interpretation is concerned, especially in cases of aggravation of preexisting disease. Our disputes will never be resolved by clinical statistics,
nor indeed by any statistics or probabilities, so long as attorneys can
produce physicians who will testify to the validity of highly improbable
possibility.21'
210. See IA A. LARSON, supra note 128, §§ 38.10-.83.
211. The concurring opinion specifically states in the penultimate paragraph that the evidence
proved that Henderson's work was "physically strenuous," and that no reason existed to require
proof of one specific episode of "physical exertion" the instant before death because the doctors
did not require such a fact situation in order to reach the causation issue. Then, in the last
paragraph quoted above, note 209 supra and accompanying text, the opinion converts "physically strenuous" into "strain... by this day's work" and finds a reasonable basis for the conclusion
that the job "probably" caused the heart attack. 544 S.W.2d at 655.
212. Committee on the Effect of Strain and Trauma on the Heart and Great Vessels, Report,
26 CIRCULATION 612-22 (1962), reprinted in E. SAGALL & B. REED, supra note 185, app. IV, at
772-87.
The aim of the Committee and its various sub-committees was to determine the effect, if any,
of physical activities and strains on victims proven at autopsy to have died of coronary heart
disease. The Committee was reconstituted in 1953 and chaired by Dr. Paul Dudley White.
213. One Committee recommendation was: "That action be taken to improve the quality of
medical testimony and that this be considered the duty of the individual state medical societies
with the cooperation of the American Heart Association and the American Medical Association,
if requested." Id. at 618.
214. Id. (emphasis added). The Committee specifically suggested that heart failure (congestive, myocardial ischemia, sudden death, etc., should be considered related to physical or
emotional exertion only if the heart failure occurs during the actual period of stress clearly
unusual for the individual involved. Id.
215. Id. at 617 (emphasis added). The report contained individual Committee members'
beliefs regarding workmen's compensation coverage and heart disease. Dr. Paul Dudley White
noted:
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Although the Committee's findings and conclusion have not been altered to
this day, most of the courts and most of the legislatures do not appear to have
noticed its recommendations. 1 16 One exception, however, is the state of
Kansas. In a long line of decisions the Kansas courts had held that disability
and death arising from heart and related problems were compensable when a
workman's usual employment was the cause or contributing cause, regardless of pre-existing disease or predisposing factors, of the injury." 7
The Kansas legislature, however, discontented with the Kansas Supreme
Court decisions, rejected the court's reasoning in heart cases" 8 by amending
the compensation act in1967 to provide as follows:
Compensation shall not be paid in case of coronary or coronary artery
disease or cerebrovascular injury unless it is shown that the exertion of
the work necessary to precipitate the disability was more than the
workman's usual work in the course of the workman's regular
employment. 1 9
It is submitted that the current Texas approach to heart attack and stroke
cases, giving lip service only to the strain and overexertion requirement, not
only ignores current medical knowledge but results in the courts' straining
credibility and fabricating theories of recovery which result in a maze of
inconsistent and often ludicrous opinions. Henderson may portend an even
more liberal inconsistency despite the fact that there is still no scientificmedical evidence to support such liberalization. If a change is to be made in
this area, it is submitted that Professor Larson's proposed heart attack and
22
stroke rule220 is the modern day remedy to a problem shrouded in ignorance. '
Coronary atherosclerosis and other atherosclerosis, for example, of the cerebral
circulation, the renal arteries, and the leg artieries, are almost universal in the
United States. They affect practically everyone, at least to some degree, even
though not producing symptoms or death; thus professional people, such as
lawyers, and doctors themselves, business people, and public officials are just as
much affected as the workmen in the various industries and they have heart
attacks that are no more caused by their work than are the heart attacks of the
physical or clerical laborers. It is quite evident that this atherosclerosis, which is
our main problem, is a disease of prosperity. Whatever we can do to reduce its
occurrence will be much more important eventually than continuing to be worried
about workmen's compensation.
Id. at 616. The report went on to note:
Other members have also stated the belief that physicians, pathologists, and
lawyers cannot solve the matter of the relation of acute coronary occlusion to
stress and strain and have agreed that the practical answer is to remove heart
disease from workmen's compensation and cover its ravages in industry by
comprehensive medical care insurance.
Id at 617.
216. See IA A. LARSON, supra note 128, §§ 38.10-.83.
217. Hanna v. Edward Gray Corp., 197 Kan. 793,421 P.2d 205 (1966); Mein v. Meade County,
197 Kan. 810,421 P.2d 177 (1966); Pinkston v. Rice Motor Co., 180 Kan. 295,303 P.2d 197 (1956);
Gilliland v. Ash Grove Lime Portland Cement Co., 104 Kan. 771, 180 P. 793 (1919).
218. See Kelly, The Unusual-Exertion Requirement and Employment-Connected Heart Attacks. 16 KAN. L. REV. 411, 412-16 (1968).
219. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-501 (1973) (emphasis added); see Dial v. C.V. Dome Co., 213 Kan.
262,515 P.2d 1046 (1973); Nichols v. Kansas State Highway Comm'n, 211 Kan. 919,508 P.2d 856
(1973); Lyon v. Wilson, 201 Kan. 768, 443 P.2d 314 (1968).
220. IA A. LARSON, supra note 128, § 38.83, at 7-169 to -202.
221. In addition to Henderson, there were two other heart attack cases and one stroke case
decided during the survey year. None of these offered any surprises. In Commercial Standard
Fire & Marine Co. v. Thornton, 540 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, writ ref'd
n.r.e.), the deceased suffered a heart attack on Feb. 28, 1974, and died May 30, 1974. Jury
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Death Benefits-Beneficiaries. In Banegas v. Holmquist 222 the natural
minor daughter of a deceased workman, adopted by another prior to the
workman's death, sought to recover death benefits under the Compensation
Act. Despite the supreme court's holding in Patton v. Shamburger,223 involving precisely the same question, the minor contended that the adoption
provision of the new Family Code should change the result. Alternatively, the
minor argued that denying her death benefits deprived her of property
without due process of law and was therefore contrary to the equal protection
clause of the United States Constitution.
The El Paso court of civil appeals disposed of both arguments, noting first
that the adoption provision of the new Family Code had exactly the same
wording as the old adoption statute; 224 therefore, the court could not distinguish the Patton decision. With respect to the equal protection and due
process arguments, the beneficiary relied upon the decision in Dickerson v.
Texas Employers'InsuranceAss 'n.22 In Dickerson the Dallas court of civil
appeals distinguished Patton because no constitutional questions had been
raised in that case. In Dickerson one of the deceased workman's five children
had been adopted prior to his death, but the others had not. The Dallas court
held that the exclusion of the adopted child amounted to an invidious
discrimination between two equal classes of children without fault since the
226
one child had been adopted without any particular choice in the matter.
The El Paso court of civil appeals in Banegas apparently sought to
distinguish Dickerson since the minor beneficiary was the sole child of the
deceased workman and, therefore, not part of a class. Relying upon the
supreme court's holding in Patton to the effect that adopted minor children
are no longer minor children of the natural father insofar as workmen's
compensation statutes are concerned, the El Paso court held that the minor
child had not been deprived of a right but had simply transferred the right
and that, therefore, there was no violation of the
from one parent to another
227
equal protection clause.
findings were favorable to the beneficiaries. The opinion was primarily concerned with the
circumstantial evidence offered to prove strain and overexertion. The court of civil appeals
overruled all of the carrier's points of error, holding that there was sufficient direct evidence from

which the jury could reasonably infer strain and overexertion. In Mueller v. Charter Oak Fire Ins.

Co., 533 S.W.2d 123 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.), the jury failed to find that the
decedent's heart attack occurred in the course and scope of his employment. The court of civil
appeals affirmed the trial court judgment against the beneficiary's attack on legal and factual
insufficiency. See note 125 supra and accompanying test. A stroke case was decided by the Waco

court of civil appeals in Pacific Employers Indem. Co. v. Custer, 540 S.W.2d 780 (Tex. Civ.

App.-Waco 1976), remanded to trial court for settlement, 20 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 36 (Nov. 13, 1976).
The evidence revealed that the deceased moved two large, heavy acetylene bottles and immediately turned red, had a severe pain in his head, and vomited. Medical testimony connected
the strain and overexertion to the stroke and subsequent death. The appeal was primarily
concerned with the trial court's special issues which the carrier contended did not fairly submit
the controlling issues. The court of civil appeals overruled those points of error as well as the legal
and factual insufficiency points of error and affirmed the trial court's judgment.
222. 535 S.W.2d 410 (Tex. Civ. App.-EI Paso 1976, no writ).
223. 431 S.W.2d 506 (Tex. 1968).
224. 535 S.W.2d at 411.
225. 451 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1970, no writ).

226. Id. at 797.
227.

535 S.W.2d at 412.
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Wrongful Discharge and Discrimination. A 1971 amendment to the Compensation Act provided that an employer could not discharge or in any
manner discriminate against any employee because the employee, in good
faith, filed a compensation claim, hired an attorney to represent him, or
instituted any proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act, or be228
cause he testified or was about to testify in any compensation proceeding.
Until this survey year only four cases 229 involved this portion of the statute,
but in each case the courts found it unnecessary actually to interpret the
specific provisions of this article. This year, however, marked the first
appellate opinion involving an interpretation of the statute and the first
published opinion wherein the employee has recovered damages from a
discriminating employer.
In Texas Steel Co. v. Douglas231 the jury found that the employee was
terminated because he instituted a proceeding under the workmen's compensation law and awarded the employee lost wages which had accrued to the
time of trial in the amount of $1,500 as well as future lost wages in the amount
of $1,000. The evidence revealed that the employee sustained an on-the-job
injury on March 8, 1973. On March 12 he went to the first aid station for
treatment, and at that time he reported the injury to his superintendent,
Pender. He was then sent to two different doctors for examination and
treatment and was paid two weeks of compensation by the employer's
carrier.
According to the court's interpretation of the evidence, it was shown that
Pender, after learning of the injury, encouraged the doctor who was treating
the claimant to release him for light duty work.2 31 At that time the doctor
advised that the employee's condition was such that he should not be required
to lift more than five-to eight-pound objects or to bend more than one time
each hour while performing light duty work.2 32 On April 6, 1973, Pender
informed the claimant that the doctor had released him for light duty work and
told him to report to the plant at 6:00 a.m. on April 9. The employee testified
that he did not report for work on April 9 until 9:00 a.m. because he had "been
hurting and could not sleep so he had taken sleeping pills and overslept that
morning." 233 When the employee arrived at work, Pender immediately fired
him for not reporting to work on time. In accordance with the jury's verdict
the trial court entered judgment for the employee.
The employer's primary point on appeal was that the employee failed to
228. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
229. Lewis v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 528 S.W.2d 635 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1975, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Brown v. Brookside Div. of Safeway Stores, Inc., 517 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1974, no writ); Swanson v. American Mfg. Co., 511 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The fourth case, Fernandez v. Reynolds Metal Co.,
384 F. Supp. 1281 (S.D. Tex. 1974), involved the issue of whether an employee's action pursuant
to art. 8307c could be removed to federal court. Upon the employee's motion to remove, the
federal district court held that the cause of action was one being asserted under the state
workmen's compensation statute and that the removal statute (28 U.S.C. § 1445 (1970))
specifically prohibited the removal of such a case to the federal courts.
230. 533 S.W.2d I11 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
231. Id. at 117.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 115.
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prove, under the provisions of article 8307c, 234 that he had instituted a

proceeding under the Compensation Act, since at the time of discharge the
employee had not filed a claim for compensation with the Industrial Accident
Board. The Fort Worth court rejected this argument, concluding that, had the
legislature intended for a formal claim to be filed before this article became
effective, then all the employer would have to do in order to avoid the
consequences of the statute would be to fire the injured employee prior to the
time he filed a claim with the Board.
The employer next argued that there was no evidence and insufficient
evidence to support the jury's answers to the damage issues. The evidence
revealed that the employee earned $2.70 per hour for his regular work and
would have earned the same amount for light duty. According to the employer, the most the employee earned since his discharge was $2.40 per hour.
The court overruled the legal and factual challenges to the evidence. Responding to the employer's related challenge of the trial court's instruction on
mitigation was properly submitted to the jury by an instruction accompanying the damage issue and that this was done without objection. This would
seem to be the correct result even had the employer objected, since the
supreme court as early as 1967235 suggested that the better practice would be
to instruct the jury in the damage issue itself as to the law of mitigation of
damages. The remainder of the employer's points of error regarding incorrect
measure of damages and special exceptions to the employee's petition were
held to have been waived and thus overruled. Accordingly, the court of civil
23 6
appeals affirmed in all respects the trial court's judgment.
Independent Contractorvs. Employee. The Compensation Act does not, of
course, provide compensation for independent contractors. The distinction
between an independent contractor and an employee, however, based
primarily on control or the right of control of the details of the work, 237 can
sometimes be elusive. In the absence of a written contract, the actual exercise
of control by the alleged
employer is sufficient to establish an employer238
employee relationship.
This year the San Antonio court of appeals wrote an excellent opinion on
this subject in HartfordAccident & Indemnity Co. v. Hooten. 239 Ms. Hooten
worked as a nurses' aide. In April 1970 she was employed as a private duty
nurse to care for an elderly patient in the Del Rio Nursing Home. Ms. Hooten
234. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c (Vernon Supp. 1976-77), which provides, in part
(emphasis added):
Section 1. No person may discharge or in any other manner discriminate against
any employee because the employee has in good faith filed a claim, hired a lawyer
to represent him in a claim, instituted, or caused to be instituted, in good faith,
any proceeding under the Texas Workmen's Compensation Act . ...
235. Moulton v. Alamo Ambulance Serv., Inc., 414 S.W.2d 444, 450 (Tex. 1967).
236. For a general survey of wrongful termination trial tactics see Gabert, Suggestions for
Wrongful Termination Litigation in Workmen's Compensation Cases, 10 TRIAL LAW. F.,
Oct.-Dec. 1975, at 55-59.
237. See, e.g., Continental Ins. Co. v. Wolford, 526 S.W.2d 539 (Tex. 1975); Anchor Cas. Co.
v. Hartsfield, 390 S.W.2d 469 (Tex. 1965); Newspapers, Inc. v. Love, 380 S.W.2d 582 (Tex.
1964).
238. Cases cited at note 237 supra.
239. 531 S.W.2d 365 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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worked an eight-hour shift from 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. and was paid for her
services by the individual patient's family.
Upon assuming her duties in the nursing home, Ms. Hooten was told by the
nursing home supervisor that Ms. Hooten would be responsible for the
general care of the patient, including bathing and feeding the patient, cleaning
the room, changing the bed linen daily, administering medication, exercising
the patient, and generally taking care of all of the patient's needs. According
to Ms. Hooten, she was told that her duties also included taking soiled linens
to the laundry room and returning food trays to the kitchen. Ms. Hooten also
testified that she had "no doubt" that if she failed to perform her duties or
disobeyed her instructions the nursing supervisor could dismiss her or have
her dismissed. Ms. Hooten further testified that she was "told what to do and
how they did it" at the nursing home.
It was generally the nursing home policy to charge private nurses for meals.
Ms. Hooten, however, entered into an agreement with the management to the
effect that if she "helped out" with other patients she would not be charged
for her meals. The evidence was undisputed that she did, in fact, help to care
for other patients, and Ms. Hooten testified that she usually stayed at the
nursing home at least one extra hour in order to help out.
On the day of her injury Ms. Hooten was told that there would be a state
board inspection and that she was to clean, bathe, and feed her patient, and
clean the patient's room. Ms. Hooten performed these tasks, which did not
differ from her daily routine except that she apparently made an effort to
perform them earlier than usual. She then took the soiled linen to the laundry
room, and on her way back from the laundry room she slipped and fell,
injuring her knee.
The critical items of evidence established that Ms. Hooten admitted that
her primary obligation was to her private patient and that if this patient needed
her she could not have been forced to do anything for anyone else. The
evidence showed that if Ms. Hooten had not been employed to take care of
this private patient, regular employees of the nursing home would have
performed all of the tasks that she performed. Further, had Ms. Hooten
needed help in administering to her private patient she could have obtained
assistance from the nursing home employees.
The court of civil appeals recognized that the traditional test for determining an employer-employee relationship is whether the alleged employer has
the right to control the details of the work. If the right of control, however,
goes no further than is necessary to insure a satisfactory result, the control
factor does not in itself establish an employer-employee relationship. Observing that the compensation concept of employee,2 40 requiring an express or
implied contract of hire, is narrower than the common law concept,2 4' the
court found no evidence of such a contract between Ms. Hooten and the
240. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8309 (Vernon 1967) defines "employee" as meaning
"every person in the service of another under any contract of hire, expressed or implied, oral or
written."
241. 531 S.W.2d at 367. The court pointed out that at common law, for purposes of vicarious
liability, the employer-employee relationship could be established without a contract, citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 221, Comment c (1958).
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nursing home in connection with her care of the private patient. The court
determined that the detailed instructions which Ms. Hooten alleged that she
received from the nursing supervisor were primarily the instructions of the
patient's physician which were merely relayed to Ms. Hooten by the supervisor. As for those instructions which involved the nursing home's established procedures, the court held that persons should not be regarded as
employees of the hospital just because they are required to comply with
hospital regulations which are necessary for the orderly performance of
hospital functions.2 42 The court also dismissed the claimant's argument that
she would have done anything that she was told to do by relying upon the
supreme court's opinion in Anchor Casualty Co. v. Hartsfield.243 In
Hartsfield the court held that the mere testimony that the alleged employee
would have done whatever he was told to do was insufficient to establish the
employer-employee relationship.
Finally, the court recognized that it was possible that the claimant could
have been the hospital's employee while she was performing chores in
accordance with her agreement to help out in exchange for her meals. The
determining factor, therefore, was the claimant's status at the time of injury.
According to the claimant's own testimony, she was injured while performing
a task she routinely performed as part of her private nursing duties as
distinguished from a task that she was called upon to perform in exchange for
her meals. Accordingly, the court held that there was no evidence to support
the jury's finding that the claimant was an employee at the time of her injury,
and the court reversed the trial court's judgment and rendered judgment for
the carrier.
Suits to Mature Awards. Article 8307, section 5a2 " provides that if a carrier
fails or refuses to pay a final award or to file suit to set the same aside then the
claimant may file suit to mature the award. If the claimant secures a judgment
sustaining the Board's ruling, he may also recover twelve percent interest and
a reasonable attorney's fee. The Tyler court sustained such an award in
American Motorists Insurance Co. v. Box. 24 5 The facts giving rise to the suit
were rather complicated. Apparently, the Board made an award on a death
claim, and the carrier gave notice of appeal. Thirteen days beyond the
twenty-day time limit 246 in which to file suit in district court to set aside the
242.
243.

531 S.W.2d at 368, citing several out-of-state cases.
390 S.W.2d 469 (Tex. 1965).

244.

TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 5a (Vernon 1967). This section provides, in part,

as follows:
In all cases where the Board shall make a final order, ruling or decision . . .
against the Association, and the Association shall fail and refuse to obey or
comply with the same and shall fail or refuse to bring suit to set the same aside
.

. then . . . the claimant . . . may bring suit where the injury occurred, upon

said order, ruling or decision. If he secures a judgment sustaining such order,
ruling or decision in whole or in part, he shall also be entitled to recover the
further sum of twelve percent (12%) as damages upon the amount of compensation so recovered in said judgment, together with a reasonable attorney's fee for
the prosecution and collection of such claim.
245. 531 S.W.2d 401 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See also American

Motorists Ins. Co. v. Box, 531 S.W.2d 407 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.),

wherein the Tyler court rejected the carrier's bill of review action prosecuted on the same fact
situation. The court upheld the dismissal of the bill since the carrier had its remedy by appeal.
246. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 5 (Vernon 1967).
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Board's award, the carrier filed a petition in Nacogdoches County. The
claimants answered the suit, asserting a cross-action to mature the Board's
award, and then filed a separate suit in Nacogdoches County district court to
mature the Board's award and collect twelve percent penalty and a reasonable
attorney's fee. The suits were consolidated. The trial court rendered a partial
summary judgment for the claimants, awarding the Board's award and the
twelve percent penalty but reserving the attorney's fees claim for a jury trial.
Upon trial of that issue, a jury awarded $3,750 in attorney's fees.
On appeal the carrier contended that the trial court erred in granting the
partial summary judgment because, as a matter of equity, a fact issue existed
as to whether the carrier's suit appealing the Board's award was timely filed in
the district court. The carrier alleged that its attorney timely mailed the
petition to the Nacogdoches County district clerk but that the United States
Postal Service did not deliver the petition but instead returned it to the
attorney after the date in which to timely file the appeal. The court of civil
appeals correctly held that the well-settled judicial interpretation of section 5
of article 8307247 provided that twenty-day notice to the Board and the
twenty-day filing limitation are jurisdictional and mandatory. 248 Thus, when
the carrier selected the postal service as its vehicle to deliver and file the
petition, the postal service, became the carrier's agent, and the carrier was
bound by the postal authority's failure to deliver the letter within the
twenty-day period allowed by the statute. 249 As a matter of law, therefore, the
Nacogdoches County district court did not acquire jurisdiction of the carrier's attempted appeal.
The court also held that since the carrier did not attempt to justify its failure
to pay the Board's award, and since the award was a debt due and owing to the
claimants, the trial court had no choice but to grant the partial summary
judgment in the amount of the Board's award plus twelve percent penalty.
The attorney's fees, as the trial court held, were a fact issue to be decided by
the jury. The carrier also raised other technical points of error including the
legal and factual insufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's award of
attorney's fees. The court, however, overruled all of these points and
affirmed in all respects the trial court's judgment.
Suit to Set Aside Board Award. The Box case illustrates the most frequent
reason that compensation appeals are dismissed: the requirement that a suit to
set aside a Board award be filed within twenty days of the date of filing
notice of intention to appeal. A second frequent reason for dismissal is for
filing suit against the wrong insurance company.250 In this survey year a
variety of reasons arose for dismissing suits to set aside Board awards.
247. Id.
248. 531 S.W.2d at 405; see Oilmen's Reciprocal Ass'n v. Franklin, 116Tex. 59, 286 S.W. 195
(1926); Richards v. Consolidated Underwriters, 411 S.W.2d 436 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1967, writ ref'd).
249. See authority cited at note 248 supra.
250. E.g., Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co. v. Square, 526 S.W.2d 635 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Garcia v. Employers Cas. Co., 519 S.W.2d 685 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Carpenter v. Gulf Ins. Co., 515 S.W.2d 60 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1974, no writ); Commercial Standard Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Martin, 501 S.W.2d 430 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1973), jdgmt modified per curiam, 505 S.W.2d 799 (Tex. 1974).
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Fortunately, one such suit, Texas Employers'InsuranceAss' v. Sarver,2 51
was remanded for trial. The action involved an award of death benefits to a
widow and minor child. The carrier filed a petition naming as defendants
"Ethelene Sarver, a widow, and Ethelene Sarver, as a natural guardian and
next friend of Lisa Ann Sarver, a minor." 2 52 Lisa Ann Sarver, however, filed
her answer by and through her natural guardian and next friend, Maggie
Bloomfield, alleging that the carrier incorrectly named Ethelene Sarver to be
her natural guardian. The facts revealed that Lisa Ann Sarver had been born
during an earlier marriage of the deceased workman to Maggie Bloomfield.
The trial court dismissed the carrier's appeal insofar as the minor beneficiary
was concerned and severed the widow's suit, which had been settled.
The court of civil appeals noted that the Board's award was to Ethelene
Sarver, a widow, and to "the mother, as natural guardian and next friend of
Lisa Ann Sarver, minor child, or to the person having custody of said minor
child, until guardianship is established.. 2 3 The question was whether Lisa
Ann Sarver was made a party to the suit by the original petititon which
designated Ethelene Sarver as the natural guardian and next friend of Lisa
Ann Sarver. The court noted that this was a case of first impression and that
there was scant authority upon which it could rely to determine whether the
minor had been properly made a party to the suit.
The court, after discussing the well-known fact that a minor without legal
guardian may not institute suit except by a next friend and must be represented by a court appointed guardian ad litem when sued, simply relied upon
the fact that the petition made it "crystal clear" that the carrier intended to
appeal from the Board's award. The fact that the attorney incorrectly
assumed that the widow was also the mother of the minor child made no
difference in the court's opinion. Relying upon CharterOak FireInsurance
Co. v. Square,2 4 the court reversed and remanded the cause for trial.
In Castillo v. Allied Insurance Co. 255 the claimant filed suit in federal
district court to set aside the Board's award. That court dismissed the
claimant's suit because of lack of diversity of citizenship. Subsequently,
claimant filed suit in state district court, but the trial court dismissed the
petition for lack of jurisdiction.
On appeal the claimant contended that the federal court filing and dismissal
and refiling in state court constituted proper compliance with the twenty-day
limitation because of the provision of article 5539a. 256 This article provides
that if an action be dismissed because of want of jurisdiction and if it is refiled
in a court of proper jurisdiction within sixty days, the period between the first
filing and the second filing shall not be counted as a part of the period of
limitation. Relying upon two prior opinions 257 which had rejected the same
argument, the court of civil appeals held that the Workmen's Compensation
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

531 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
Id.at 411.
Id.at 412.
526 S.W.2d 635 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
537 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5539a (Vernon 1967).
537 S.W.2d at 487 and cases cited.
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Act was not subject to the general statute of limitation provided in article
5539a.
The claimant next contended that, since she refiled suit in state district
court within twenty days after the federal action was dismissed for want of
25
diversity jurisdiction, she had substantially complied with article 8307a
which provides that a suit to set aside a Board's award may be transferred to
the county of injury if originally filed in a county other than where the injury
occurred without disturbing the jurisdiction of either court. The court noted,
however, that the diversity of citizenship jurisdictional statute 259 was
amended in 1964 to provide that an insurer is a resident of the state in which
the insured is also a citizen. Thus, the federal court did not have jurisdiction
because of a lack of diversity of citizenship, and it could not be considered to
be a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter within the contemplation
of article 8307a. Accordingly, the trial court judgment dismissing the claimant's cause of action was affirmed.
Finally, in Transport InsuranceCo. v. Jaeger2" the unbelievable occurred.
The Board entered its award in favor of the claimant and against Transport
Insurance Company, the workmen's compensation carrier for Merchants
Fast Motor Lines, Inc. The carrier properly gave notice of intention to appeal,
and two days later a suit styled in the name of the claimant's employer,
Merchants Fast Motor Lines, Inc., versus the claimant was filed in district
court. After the twenty-day period had expired, the claimant filed a motion to
dismiss for want of jurisdiction, and the carrier immediately amended its
petition, restyling it to include the carrier as well as the employer. The trial
court, however, dismissed the suit for want of jurisdiction.
On appeal the carrier contended that by mistake it had failed to name itself
in the original petition but that the four corners of the pleading showed that
the carrier had intended to file the suit in its name, an argument amounting to
misnomer rather than a matter of mistaken identity. The court reviewed the
petition and found that in many instances the carrier's name was used but also
found that each time the term "plaintiff" was used, the employer was
identified as the plaintiff. Noting that article 8307, section 5261 provides that an
interested party must file suit to set aside the Board's award, the court held
that the employer, not a party to the Board's award, was not a proper party to
262
the suit to set aside the award.
Misnomer has been a frequently litigated issue in recent years.2 63 Any
attorney representing a claimant or carrier should consider these recent
opinions and the importance of naming the appropriate party defendant.
Insurance carriers frequently have in their corporate structures numerous
subsidiary companies which are in fact separate, distinct entities. Unless the
258. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307a (Vernon 1967).
259. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1970).
260. 534 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
261. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 5 (Vernon 1967).
262. 534 S.W.2d at 391 and cases cited. The court distinguished Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co. v.
Square, 526 S.W.2d 635 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.), and relied upon Garcia v.
Employers Cas. Co., 519 S.W.2d 685 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.), in
affirming the trial court's dismissal.
263.

See note 250 supra and accompanying text.
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attorney exercises care in naming a particular company as a party, he may risk
having the appeal of his client-employee or carrier-dismissed for want of

jurisdiction .264
Compromise Settlement Agreement-Suit to Set Aside. The law favors
voluntary settlements. Thus, the general rule is that such agreements can be
265
set aside only for fraudulent representations relied upon by the employee.
The Amarillo court of civil appeals reaffirmed the general rule in Alvarez v.
Employers' Fire Insurance Co. 26 The claimant in that case suffered a back
injury in March 1972 and was treated by a physician to whom she was referred
by the carrier. This physician originally diagnosed a mild disc herniation and
treated the claimant conservatively. A few months later, although the claimant continued to complain of pain, this physician diagnosed a chronic lumbosacral strain. He further indicated that no additional treatment was necessary and that in his opinion she had a five percent permanent partial disability.
A few weeks later, at an Industrial Accident Board prehearing conference,
the parties agreed that another physician would examine the claimant. This
examination revealed compression fractures of two vertebrae, but these
fractures did not require additional treatment other than conservative care.
Thereafter, a compromise settlement was negotiated and approved by the
Board for $1,200 in addition to the $744.32 previously paid to the claimant. All
past medical was also paid and future medical was open for one year.
Immediately prior to the consummation of the settlement agreement, the
claimant's attorney explained to her all of her options but also advised her that
the carrier's doctor was an expert whose opinion was highly respected and
that his five percent disability estimate would probably mean that she would
recover approximately $1,000 if the case were tried. Thus, the claimant opted
for a compromise settlement. The attorney later testified that he relied upon
the report of the carrier's doctor and believed that the claimant also relied on
that report in making the settlement.
Subsequently, in February 1973 the claimant underwent a laminectomy,
and the carrier's doctor, who originally treated the claimant, estimated that
she had a ten percent permanent partial loss of earning capacity. Thereafter,
the claimant instituted a suit to set aside the settlement agreement, alleging
that she was induced to settle the claim through the material medical misrepresentations of the carrier's agent, the doctor to whom she was initially
264. The litigation history of Jaeger is interesting. Not only did Jaeger recover total and
permanent compensation benefits as a result of the Board's award, but he also subsequently tried
and won a suit to mature the same Board's award, recovering a 12% penalty plus $3,100
attorney's fees. Subsequently the supreme court wrote an opinion in a case wherein the same
Bernhardt Jaeger had recovered a judgment against Republic Bankers Life Insurance Company
for insurance disability benefits arising out of the same back injury made the basis of the
compensation suits. Jaeger recovered $300 per month for 60 months. The supreme court's
opinion was primarily concerned with the measure of damages because of the insurance
company's repudiation of the contract. Republic Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Jaeger, 20 Tex. Sup.
Ct. J. 43 (Nov. 17, 1976) (per curiam opinion on motion for rehearing of application for writ of
error).
265. See, e.g., Brannon v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 148 Tex. 289, 224 S.W.2d 466 (1949);
Inter-Ocean Cas. Co. v. Johnston, 123 Tex. 592, 72 S.W.2d 583 (1934); Mullens v. Texas
Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 507 S.W.2d 317 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Bullock
v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 254 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1952, writ ref'd).
266. 531 S.W.2d 218 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1975, no writ).
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referred. She also alleged that the carrier engaged in a scheme of fraud in
order to induce her to settle her claim while it had full knowledge that her
injuries were severe and disabling. The trial court, however, at the conclusion
of the claimant's evidence, directed a verdict for the carrier, and the court of
civil appeals affirmed.
The court of civil appeals noted that in order to set aside a compromise
settlement agreement the claimant must prove a meritorious claim for compensation in an amount greater than the amount paid, false representations by
the doctor notwithstanding that he may have made them in good faith, her
belief in the false representations, and, finally, inducement of her participa267
tion in the settlement by reason of her belief in the false representations. If
the claimant failed to produce evidence on any essential element her cause of
action would fail. The court pointed out that the claimant had proved a
meritorious claim for more compensation than she had received in the
compromise settlement agreement but had failed to produce any evidence
that she believed the doctor's representations were true or that she relied
upon their veracity in agreeing to the settlement. She never testified as to such
reliance. In fact, she had always contended that she was not able to work, a
belief which was diametrically opposed to the requirement that she actually
believed the doctor's representations and relied upon them in making the
settlement. Thus, the court held that there was no evidence to support this
element of the claimant's cause of action.
Suits Against Nonsubscribers. Rapidly expanding compensation coverage
and the concomitant escalation in premiums have increased the importance of
this area of compensation law as employers seek relief from rising costs. The
Texas Association of Business intends to recommend to the 1977 legislature
that responsible employers be allowed to self insure their workmen's compensation risks. 21 If this legislation does not pass, there may well be a
substantial increase in the number of suits against nonsubscribers in an
attempt to reduce compensation insurance premiums. A nonsubscriber is
subject to suit for all damages suffered by an employee injured in the scope of
his employment, and all common law defenses are waived. The employee,
however, must prove negligence on the part of the employer. 26 9 Two rather
interesting cases occurred in this area during the survey year, one being a case
of first impression.
In Tigrett v. Heritage Building Co. 27 the employee filed suit against her
nonsubscriber employer alleging an oral contract to pay the equivalent of
267.
268.

Id. at 221 and cases cited.
See Gray, supra note 14. The self-insurance argument is as follows:
Texas is the only state in the union, with the exception of four or five exclusive
state fund states, which does not permit employers to insure their own risks. This
means that the employer in Texas is in a straight jacket and has no alternative but
to purchase an insurance policy and pay the rates set by the State Board of
Insurance based upon insurance company statistics. The existence of selfinsurance would bring about price competition in workers' compensation
insurance.
Id. at 4.
269. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, §§ 1, 4 (Vernon 1967).
270. 533 S.W.2d 65 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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workmen's compensation benefits. The Texarkana court of civil appeals held
that the employee had a valid action for breach of contract and that such
contract was not contrary to public policy. This precise question had not been
decided in Texas prior to the Tigrett case.
A few months before her injury the claimant was advised by a work
supervisor that the company was so generous that they even had paid
workmen's compensation benefits to a man who had not been injured on the
job. A few days after her injury on the job the claimant requested workmen's
compensation benefits, and she received nine weekly checks in the amount of
$49 each (the applicable compensation rate at the date of injury) drawn on the
company's compensation account, with several checks distinctly marked as
workmen's compensation payments. The claimant originally consulted her
personal physician but was later directed by the company supervisor to
consult certain other physicians chosen by the company. After several
months of medical treatment by these physicians, the company declined to
continue payment of the compensation benefits or the medical expenses.
The jury found that the company did indeed offer to provide employees
with the same benefits as would have been received under the Texas Workmen's Compensation Act and further found that the claimant accepted the
offer, thereby consummating a contract. The jury awarded total and permanent benefits. On the company's motion for judgment non obstante veredicto, the trial court entered a take nothing judgment, and the claimant appealed.
The first question before the Texarkana court of appeals was whether the
nonsubscriber sections of article 8306271 confined the claimant to a negligent
tort action for recovery of damages for personal injuries received in the
course of her employment and excluded a breach of contract action. The
company contended that the sections were mandatory when providing for a
negligent tort action for recovery of damages against a nonsubscriber and,
therefore, excluded any other type of action for personal injuries. The court
of civil appeals noted that the same exclusive remedy contention had been
made in Anderson-Berney Realty Co. v. Soria.2 7 2 In the Soria case the
employer had been a subscriber at the time of the claimant's employment but
had permitted the coverage to lapse without notice to the employees. The
cause of action asserted by Soria, therefore, was for breach of the employment contract which, when made, provided for Texas workmen's compensation coverage. 273 Since the supreme court in Soria allowed an employee to
prosecute a breach of contract action, the Texarkana court held that the
employee in Tigrett would not be confined to a simple negligence suit as
specified in the statute.
The court then turned to the question of whether the employee had actually
established a contract with the employer. The court found the essential
271. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, §§ 1, 4 (Vernon 1967).
272. 123 Tex. 100, 67 S.W.2d 222 (1933). The Texarkana court took the time and made the
effort to examine the briefs on file in the supreme court as well as the court's opinion in order to
confirm the fact that the exclusive remedy contention had also been made in that case. 533
S.W.2d at 67 n.4.
273. The same contention made in Soria was sustained in Crain v. Thompson, 510 S.W.2d 412
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no writ). The Dallas court based its decision on the Soriacase. Id.
at 413.
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elements of a contract and found evidence of partial performance both by the
employee and the employer. Thus, the court held that a contract to measure
an existing, unliquidated claim for damages by the terms of the Workmen's
Compensation Act was not contrary to public policy as contended by the
employer.27 4 Accordingly, the trial court judgment was reversed and judgment was rendered that the employee recover total and permanent benefits.
It is important to note that the Court's holding is based on the fact that the
contract was made after the employee's injury and, therefore, dealt with
existing conditions and not with future negligence or speculative facts. A
contract to limit the employer's liability for the consequences of its own
negligence, executed priorto any injury, may be against public policy. 275 The
answer to this prior contract question, however, will have to await future
litigation.
In another nonsubscriber case, Cabrera v. Delta Brands, Inc. ,276 the
Texarkana court upheld a damage award in excess of $45,000. The employee's suit was based on the employer's failure to instruct the employee
regarding a safe method in which to move a steel plate.
The employer was engaged in manufacturing heavy industrial equipment
and machines. As part of the manufacturing process, heavy steel sheets were
routinely moved in order to be cut and welded. The employee was a Cuban
national who spoke little English. On the day of the accident the employee
was painting a heavy steel table. He found it necessary to move a steel cross
beam weighing in excess of 100 pounds. While doing so the claimant suffered
a back injury resulting in a herniated disc which required a laminectomy.
Apparently, the employer had not issued any instructions on any procedure to
be used when moving the heavy steel sheets nor had any written instructions
been posted. It was also demonstrated that the employer had acquired two
mechanical hoists to be used in moving heavy metal objects but that they had
remained in their packing crates for two years. There were two forklifts at the
plant, but one was inoperative and the other was too large to move into
position to lift the steel that the employee was moving at the time of the
accident. Moreover, the employee testified that he could not ask other
employees for help, and that the other employees would not have helped him,
because of a plant policy of firing any employees who got together for any
purpose. The employee expressed a real fear that he would be discharged
from his employment if he asked for help, and several co-workers confirmed
this fear.
The jury found the employer negligent in failing to post safety rules and
regulations concerning the movement of steel objects and found that such
failure was a proximate cause of the employee's injuries. The trial court,
274. 533 S.W.2d at 70, citing Adler v. Hohn, 129 Ohio 303, 195 N.E. 481 (1935).
275. See, e.g., Crowell v. Housing Authority, 495 S.W.2d 887 (Tex. 1973); Barnhart v.
Kansas City, M. & 0. Ry., 107 Tex. 638, 184 S.W. 176 (1916); Lone Star Gas Co. v. Veal, 378
S.W.2d 89 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
276. 538 S.W.?d 795 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Delta Brands, Inc.
seems to be a losing litigant in nonsubscriber cases. In a 1974 case the supreme court held the
evidence legally sufficient to raise an issue of employer negligence in failing to furnish an
employee safe equipment. Martinez v. Delta Brands, Inc., 515 S.W.2d 263 (Tex. 1974), reviewed
in Sartwelle, supra note 1, at 224.
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however, granted the employer's motion for judgment non obstante veredicto
and rendered judgment that the employee take nothing.
The court of civil appeals began its opinion by stating the general rule that it
is the employer's continuing and nondelegable duty to provide the employee a
safe place to work. For this proposition the court cited article 5182a 277 and
Sloan v. Leger Mill Co. 278 Based upon this generic duty, the court then
proceeded to hold, without citing authority:
[T]he employer must instruct his employees in the safe use and
handling of the products and equipment used in and around the employer's plant or facilities. Ordinarily this is done orally at safety
meetings with the employees and by posting rules and regulations
governing the method of handling equipment, products, processes and
situations which may cause injury to an employee. One of the reasons for
placing this burden on the employer is because the employer usually has
the greater knowledge or should have the greater knowledge of the
dangers and risks of injury to the employee. Obviously, the employer is
not bound to post rules in every instance. However, when the work is of a
complex or hazardous nature the duty is upon the employer
to instruct his
279
employees in the safe management of the work.
The court's reliance on article 5182a and the Sloan case seems to be
misplaced. Sloan was a suit for gross negligence under the provisions of the
Workmen's Compensation Act. 210 In essence the Sloan court held that if the
employer's business is complex and dangerous, then the employer must
safeguard the employees by the adoption of approved methods and the
promulgation of rules and regulations governing the work. The court observed, however, that the mere failure to adopt any particular rule was not
proof of negligence unless the employer should have foreseen the necessity
for rules and regulations. Moreover, the Sloan court noted that if the work
was simple in character and free from complexities, then the employer was
not under any obligation to adopt any rules or regulations. The court in Sloan
held that there was no evidence of gross negligence and affirmed a take
nothing judgment.
Article 5182a, the occupational safety statute, does indeed provide, in
section 3(a), 281 that employers shall furnish and maintain a reasonably safe
and healthful place of employment. The statute also states: "However, no
rule or standard promulgated under this Act shall, or shall be deemed to,
establish legal standards of conduct or legal duties, the violation of which
standards or duties would constitute negligence or gross negligence in any
civil proceeding. 28 2 It is apparent that the court's cited authority offers no
support for its statements and conclusions regarding rules and regulations
governing an employee's work. There is, however, substantial authority
277.

TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5182a (Vernon 1971).

278. 161 S.W.2d 333 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1942, writ ref'd w.o.m.).
279. 538 S.W.2d at 797-98. The court also stated: "If some of the employees would have
difficulty reading the instructions in English, then the employer should post the instructions in the
language most familiar to the majority of those employees who have difficulty reading and
understanding English." Id. at 798.
280. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 5 (Vernon 1967).
281. Id art. 5182a, § 3(a) (Vernon 1971).
282. Id.§ 3(c).
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supporting this proposition. Fort Worth Elevators Co. v. Russell, 2 3 cited in
passing by the Cabrera court, set out a number of absolute, nondelegable
duties that an employer owes to its employees. Among these is the duty to

provide rules and regulations for the safety of employees and the duty to warn
them, under certain conditions, as to the hazards of their employment. 28 The
Russell opinion was followed in Weingarten, Inc. v. Moore, 285 a suit involving

a nonsubscriber's failure to instruct an employee in the proper method of
lifting. The supreme court granted writ in Moore and affirmed the judgment
against the company but reversed the judgment against the company's
supervisor, who had been made a party to the suit. Thus, the supreme court
essentially approved the court of civil appeals holding regarding the employer's duty to provide rules and regulations for the safe conduct of work.
The employer in Cabrera relied upon the supreme court's opinion in
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Coker.286 The Coker case establishes the rule
that the employer is not liable for injury to an employee when he has provided

help and the injury results from the employee's voluntarily proceeding to do
the work without assistance or when help is nearby but the employee
proceeds to do the work alone without seeking assistance. The employer also
relied upon the supreme court's opinion in GreatAtlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v.
Evans287 wherein the court held that an employee cannot recover if his
employer simply requires him to do work customarily required of persons in
that particular line of employment or which is required by the character of the
business. The Cabrera court, however, emphasizing the particular fact
situation involved in the case, 288 rendered judgment for the employee on the
jury's verdict.
The Cabrera case illustrates very well the fact that nonsubscriber status
may not be an economical alternative to compensation coverage. The risk

inherent in nonsubscriber status is that the liberality of the Compensation Act
will be transferred by the courts, consciously or unconsciously, into any case
involving the employee of a nonsubscriber. Thus, the decision to become a
2 89
nonsubscriber should be made with great care.
283. 123 Tex. 128, 70 S.W.2d 397 (1934).
284. Id. at 135-36, 70 S.W.2d at 401.
285. 441 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1969), aff'd in part, rev'd in part
and remanded, 449 S.W.2d 452 (Tex. 1970).
286. 146 Tex. 190, 204 S.W.2d 977 (1947).
287. 142 Tex. 1,175 S.W.2d 249 (1943).
288. The court analyzed the facts which were critical to its holding thus:
Under the facts of this case where the chain hoists were still packed in their
original boxes and had been for a period of two years or more; where the only
operable forklift could not be moved into position to lift the steel plate; and,
where the employees were all fearful of losing their jobs if they asked for help, it
was reasonably foreseeable by appellee [the employer] that one person working
alone moving a heavy steel object could be injured and therefore Delta Brands,
Inc., had reason to anticipate an injury like the one suffered by Cabrera. There is
sufficient evidence to charge appellee with a duty to instruct appellant as to the
manner in which he could have moved the steel object safely; that it negligently
failed to give him such instructions; and that this negligence was a proximate
cause of appellant's injuries.
538 S.W.2d at 799.
289. A number of years ago, Southwestern National Insurance Company of Oklahoma City
developed a pseudo-self-insurance plan for Texas nonsubscribers. The plan is called excess
employers liability insurance or EEL coverage.
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Third-Party Action-Limitations. The statutory scheme of subrogation
and recovery from third parties was completely rewritten in 1973 when the
legislature amended section 6a of article 8307.2 9 The amended statute provides that a compensation claimant can pursue his compensation claim and
any potential third-party action at the same time without waiving his right to
compensation. Prior to 1973 a claimant was required to conclude his compensation claim before filing a third-party suit or waive compensation benefits.
Limitiations on the third-party claim, however, did not begin to run until the
compensation claim was concluded. 29' The question arose under the statute
prior to 1973 as to what constituted a conclusion of the compensation claim
for purposes of determining when the statute of limitation on the third-party
action would begin to run. It became the well established rule that the
claimant's subrogation right matured when the insured paid or assumed the
292
Watson v. Glens Falls Insurance Co. ,293
obligation to pay compensation.
however, wherein the supreme court held that future medical payments were
not within the election provision of section 6a, revived the question as to the
date that limitations began on a third-party action. Since the compensation
case would not be "concluded" until the carrier had paid all future medical
benefits to which the employee was entitled, the Watson holding appeared to
create a potentially open-ended statute of limitation.
Two cases decided during this survey year considered this precise question. Both cases held that the provisions of section 6a prior to the 1973
amendment did not apply to future medical expenses and, therefore, that the
statute of limitation on a third-party action arising prior to 1973 would be
governed by pre-1973 case law. The mere fact that future medical benefits
were still being collected would not extend the statute of limitation once the
carrier paid or assumed the liability to pay compensation. 294 Both opinions are
well considered and well written with extensive citation to authorities. Since
the 1973 amendment of section 6a, however, these opinions may be only of
historical interest.
The EEL policy is a true indemnity policy, reimbursing the employer for amounts paid to
injured employees for medical expenses and weekly benefit payments, etc., less the amount of
the employers's retention. The difference between compensation insurance and EEL coverage is
that the employer, not the insurance company, handles all claims and negotiates all settlements.
Thus, the often impersonal insurance adjuster is eliminated, and company personnel, presumably friendlier and more sympathetic to an injured co-worker, administer the program. Since
there is no compensation policy, the employer may provide whatever benefits seem fair but is
subject to a negligence suit without defenses.
Texas companies of all sizes have become nonsubscribers under the EEL plan, and many
report successful experiences in handling employee injuries as well as a substantial savings over
regular workmen's compensation insurance.
290. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 6a (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
291. See Campbell v. Sonford Chem. Co., 486 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. 1972); Fort Worth Lloyds v.
Haygood, 151 Tex. 149, 246 S.W.2d 865 (1952); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Brandon, 126
Tex. 636, 89 S.W.2d 982 (1936); Yeary v. Hinojosa, 307 S.W.2d 325 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
1957, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
292. See Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Brandon, 126 Tex. 636, 89 S.W.2d 982 (1936);
Thompson v. Graham, 318 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1958, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Texas
Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Texas P. Ry., 129 S.W.2d 746 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1939, writ
dism'd jdgmt cor.).
293. 505 S.W.2d 793 (Tex. 1974).
294. Holifield v. National Cylinder Gas Div. of Chemetron Corp., 542 S.W.2d 218 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1976, writ filed); Seward v. Robinson, 535 S.W.2d 778 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).,
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Third-Party Actions-Indemnity. In Grove ManufacturingCo. v. Cardinal
Construction Co.2 95 a third-party tortfeasor, using a unique and ingenious
argument, sought indemnity from the plaintiff's employer on the basis of
gross negligence and intentional tort. An employee of Cardinal Construction
Company was injured in the course and scope of his employment while riding
in a personnel basket being lifted by a crane. All parties involved in the
accident, including the crane operator, were employees of Cardinal. After
collecting workmen's compensation benefits, the employee filed a negligence
and strict liability suit against the seller, lessor, and manufacturer of the
crane. The manufacturer, Grove, impleaded Cardinal, alleging gross negligence and intentional tort, and praying for indemnity. Cardinal moved for
summary judgment on the ground that it was immune from liability pursuant
to the terms of the Workmen's Compensation Act, and the trial court granted
the summary judgment.
On appeal Grove recognized that article 8306, section 3296 exempts a
subscribing employer from all common law liability for negligence with the
exception of exemplary damages in a death case. As stated by the court of
civil appeals, it is well settled in Texas that a defendant has no right of
indemnity or contribution from a party against whom the injured party has no
cause of action. Thus, since the injured employee accepted compensation
benefits and since the case did not involve a death, the employee had no right
of action against his employer for negligence or gross negligence. Grove
insisted, however, that the injured employee did have a cause of action
against his employer, guaranteed by the Texas bill of rights, 97 for intentional
injury. Therefore, Grove argued, the compensation statute denying the
employee a right of action against his employer for intentional injury conflicted with the Constitution and thereby arbitrarily deprived the injured
employee of a common law right and also deprived a third party, claiming
through the injured employee, of a common law right of indemnity or
contribution.
The court of civil appeals overruled all of these contentions. The court first
noted that the injured employee, in claiming and collecting compensation
benefits, declared that he had been involved in an accidental injury and,
therefore, had not been intentionally injured. The court relied upon Middleton v. Texas Power & Light Co. 298 wherein the supreme court discussed the
difference between accidental injuries and intentional injuries and held that
the two were inconsistent with one another. 299 Thus, since the injured
employee had no cause of action against Cardinal, and since indemnity and
contribution are not independent causes of action but only derivative of the
primary plaintiff's cause of action, Grove had no cause of action for indemni3°°
ty against Cardinal.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.

534 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 3 (Vernon 1967).
TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13.
108 Tex. 96, 185 S.W. 556 (1921).
Id. at 109-10, 185 S.W. at 560-61.
534 S.W.2d at 155.

19771

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

Good Cause-GeneralInjury. The issue of good cause has been litigated as

much as any issue in compensation law. 30' It is, of course, elementary that to
perfect a claim for compensation an employee must give notice of injury and
file a claim for compensation within the time limits prescribed by the
statute.30 2 The statute also provides that for good cause strict compliance with
the limitations can be waived. 30 3 During this survey year there were four more
good cause cases decided by the appellate courts.
In Bounds v. Pacific Employers InsuranceCo. 304 the court of civil appeals
upheld an instructed verdict in the carrier's favor. The evidence revealed that
the claimant received an injury to his upper back on December 7, 1972. The
employee was hospitalized for a period of time, but he returned to work and
continued to work for the next two years. His excuse for failing to file his
claim for compensation for fifteen months after the injury was: "I didn't
know it was going to cause me any problems with my work. I assumed that it
would be better .... "305 The claimant admitted, however, that he had

continuous pain in his back at all times during the fifteen-month period and
that his physical condition continued to worsen. The court held, as a matter of
law, that a reasonably prudent person under the same or similar circumstances would not have waited fifteen months to file a claim for compensation. It was obvious that the claimant knew from the moment of the accident
that his pain and disability were caused by the accident. Moreover, there was
no evidence in the record as to when the claimant decided that his injury was
not trivial or that he would never get better. Thus, there was no evidence that
the claimant's reason for failing to file a claim for compensation continued to
exist up to the date that the claim was filed. Such evidence is, of course, a
prime prerequisite in any good cause case.30 6
In Liberty Mutual InsuranceCo. v. Stanley30 7 the claimant failed to file her

claim for compensation until two years after her injury. The claimant testified
that she was aware that her injuries resulted from a trip-and-fall accident
while at work. She reported the injury to her employer and was aware that she
should file a claim with the Industrial Accident Board. She further testified
that when she was sick or unexcused from work she knew that it was a result
of her injury and the pain that she was experiencing. She contended,
however, that she thought her injury was trivial.
The evidence revealed that the claimant consulted her personal physician
immediately after the injury and that he advised her that the injury was trivial.
Two years later her doctor told her that she would never be able to do any
301. See, e.g., Lee v. Houston Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 530 S.W.2d 294 (Tex. 1975); Texas
Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Hubbard, 518 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. 1974); Continental Cas. Co. v. Cook,
515 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. 1974); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Hughes, 497 S.W.2d 282 (Tex. 1973);
Allstate Ins. Co. v. King, 444 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. 1969); Moronko v. Consolidated Mut. Ins. Co.,
435 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1968); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Portley, 153 Tex. 62,263 S.W.2d 247
(1953); Hawkins v. Safety Cas. Co., 146 Tex. 381, 207 S.W.2d 370 (1948).
302. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 4a (Vernon 1967).
303. Id.
304. 535 S.W.2d 782 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976, no writ).
305. Id. at 782.
306. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Hubbard, 518 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. 1974); Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co. v. Hughes, 497 S.W.2d 282 (Tex. 1973); Texas Cas. Ins. Co. v. Beasley, 391 S.W.2d 33
(Tex. 1965); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Portley, 153 Tex. 62, 263 S.W.2d 247 (1953).
307. 534 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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work and would be lucky to continue to be able to walk. She then filed her
claim. During the intervening two years the claimant continued to work for
her employer but was absent from work for forty-five days as a result of her
injury. She also consulted her physician on forty-three different occasions
during this period of time. She testified, however, that during this entire
period she still considered her injury trivial. It was not until shortly before she
filed her claim for compensation that her physician advised her that her
injuries were serious.
The court of civil appeals, after citing and discussing the usual good cause
cases, simply held that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to have
concluded, as it did, that the claimant exercised the degree of diligence which
would have been exercised by a reasonably prudent person and, therefore,
affirmed the trial court's judgment in the claimant's favor. The Bounds
opinion seems questionable in light of the court's recitation of the evidence.
Although the claimant alleged that her doctor advised her that her injury was
trivial, there is nothing in the court's opinion indicating that the physician told
the claimant that she was all right or would recover. Her constant pain and
suffering should have signified to her that she was not recovering, and her
continued reliance upon the physician's statement that the injury was trivial
does not seem prudent under the facts as set forth by the court.
In Texas Employers'InsuranceAss 'n v. Portley,308 a factually similar case,
the court wrote:
[It is] clear that delay may not be excused unless the belief that the injury
or condition was not serious would have been entertained by a reasonably prudent person in the same or similar circumstances. While ordinarily the question is one for the trier of facts to determine, a mere statement
by an injured person that he did not regard his injuries as serious will not
beyond the
raise a fact issue when the facts themselves put the matter
39
pale of reason or beyond belief by a prudent person. 0
The court held that the plaintiff's condition was so serious and disabling that it
"should and would have led any reasonably prudent person under the same or
' 310
similar circumstances to protect his rights by filing his claim.
In Employers Reinsurance Corp. v. Ryne 311 the claimant sought to justify a
five-week delay in filing his claim for compensation because his employer's
compensation claim supervisor told him that the company would take care of
all of the necessary paper work. This is a common good cause excuse and, in
harmony with past precedent, 3 2 the court affirmed the judgment in the
claimant's favor.
308. 153 Tex. 62, 263 S.W.2d 247 (1954).
309. Id. at 67, 263 S.W.2d at 250.
310. Id. The Stanley opinion also seems to be in direct conflict with an almost identical fact
situation in Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Renfro, 496 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1973, writ dism'd). The Renfro court held that the claimant's delay of 17 months was
not good cause as a matter of law.
311. 531 S.W.2d 156 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1975, no writ).
312. See, e.g., Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. King, 510 S.W.2d 370 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[lst Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Kirchoff, 427 S.W.2d 638 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1968, no writ); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Godwin, 426 S.W.2d 652
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston list Dist.] 1968, no writ); Gibbs v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 378
S.W.2d 349 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

1977]

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

In Baca v. Transport Insurance Co.313 the trial court entered summary
judgment for the carrier on the issue of good cause. The claimant alleged that
he had suffered a heart attack while in the course and scope of his employment. He did not file a claim for compensation until more than two years after
the alleged injury. His doctor advised him that the heart attack was caused by
"cholesterol." It was not until he consulted a lawyer concerning other
problems that he was informed that a heart attack could be compensable. He
thereupon filed a claim for compensation.
The court of civil appeals actually disposed of the case on a pleading
irregularity. In his petition the claimant alleged the he had timely filed his
noticy of injury, but, in the alternative, if it was not timely filed, then he had
good cause for the late filing. The carrier answered with only a general denial
and immediately moved for summary judgment. The court sustained the
claimant's first point, alleging that without a verified denial 3 4 a claim for
compensation is presumed to have been filed in legal time. The court went on,
however, to hold that a mistake as to the cause of the disability was no less
good cause than a mistake as to the extent of the disability, relying upon a
similar case decided by the Amarillo court of civil appeals, King v. Texas
Employers' Insurance Ass'n,3 5 and a recent opinion of its own, Davis v.
Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n. 316 The Davis case, however, is distinguishable from the facts in Baca. Davis involved a death claim by a widow.
The testimony established that a coroner told the widow, immediately after
the decedent's heart attack, that his death resulted from natural causes. It was
not until many months later that the decedent's coworkers informed the
widow that the decedent had become sick on the day of his death but had
continued to work. She immediately filed her claim. The court upheld the
widow's reliance upon the coroner's report, analogizing the reliance to
reliance upon representations made by a medical doctor.317 Baca is closely
related to the King case relied upon by the court. Since King and Baca were
both summary judgment cases they involved a different burden of proof
which weakens their authority. The Baca court does not recite sufficient
evidentiary details to allow an in-depth analysis. The controlling authority,
however, depending upon the nature of the evidence developed at trial, would
appear to be either Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n v. Hubbard3 8 or
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Wilson.319 The real issue raised by the fact
situation in Baca is how long a claimant should be able to wait before
asserting a claim which he alleges he did not know was caused by the
employment. If two years is considered reasonable, it is interesting to
speculate as to what would be the holding regarding claims delayed for longer
periods of time.
Course and Scope-IntentionalInjury By Third Person. The Compensation
Act defines the term "injury" by excluding from its coverage four classes of
313.

538 S.W.2d 814 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1976, no writ).

314.

TEX. R. Civ. P. 93(n).

315. 416 S.W.2d 533 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
316. 516 S.W.2d 452 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1974, no writ).
317. See id. at 454-55 and cases cited and discussed therein.
318. 518 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. 1974).
319. 495 S.W.2d 579 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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injuries and including all other injuries that originate in the employer's
business and occur while the employee is engaged in the furtherance of the
employer's affairs.32 ° One of the excluded classes includes an injury caused
by a personal act of a third person which is not motivated by the employment
relationship. 32' As interpreted by the Texas courts this exclusion applies to
co-employees as well as to third persons unconnected with the employer.322
The general rule with respect to third persons has been stated as follows:
[A]n injury inflicted by a third person in a difficulty with an employee in
which the third person intends to injure the employee and the intention
arises from some cause personal to him and not directed against the
employee as such or because of his employment, he cannot recover from
the injury sustained in such a difficulty. In fact, the statute clearly so
provides.323
During the survey year the Beaumont court of civil appeals, in St. Paul
InsuranceCo. v. Van Hook,32 4 correctly decided a third-party injury case but
neglected to cite or discuss the pertinent authorities. The claimant was a
seventeen-year-old high school student and part-time janitor for the local
YMCA. His supervisor had instructed him that if he saw vandals breaking
windows he was to stop them. On the day in question, while cleaning the
parking lot, the claimant observed several boys throwing rocks through the
windows. He ordered them to stop, but they, of course, resented the order
and immediately invited the claimant to fight. At this point some older men
from a boxing club which used another part of the building in which the
YMCA was located suggested that the claimant and one other boy put on
boxing gloves to settle the dispute. During a three round fight the claimant
received two broken teeth. The claimant later learned that the rock throwers
were members of the boxing club and were apparently known to the adults
who had suggested the fight; obviously, the claimant had been set up.
The case was tried in county court since the claimant was only attempting to
recover $563 in dental expenses. From a jury verdict for the claimant, the
carrier appealed, contending that the evidence was legally and factually
insufficient to establish that the claimant was injured in the course and scope
of his employment.
The Beaumont court correctly noted that the claimant was trying to follow
his employer's instructions when he ordered the boys to terminate the rock
throwing. The court pointed out that, although the claimant could have
chosen wiser means of stopping the incident, such as phoning the police, a
320. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § I (Vernon 1967).
321.

Id.

322. E.g., United States Cas. Co. v. Hardie, 299 S.W. 871 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1927, jdgmt
adopted); Vivier v. Lumberman's Indem. Exch., 250 S.W. 417 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1923, jdgmt
adopted); Texas Indem. Ins. Co. v. Cheely, 232 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1950, writ
ref'd); Associated Employers Lloyds v. Groce, 194 S.W.2d 103 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1946,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Consolidated Underwriters v. Adams, 140 S.W.2d 221 (Tex. Civ. App.Texarkana 1940, writ dism'd jdgmt cor.); Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Mills, 108 S.W.2d 219 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Beaumont 1937, writ dism'd); Richardson v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 46
S.W.2d 439 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1932, writ ref'd).
323. Texas Indem. Ins. Co. v. Cheely, 232 S.W.2d 124, 129 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1950,
writ ref'd).
324. 533 S.W.2d 472 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976, no writ).
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seventeen-year-old boy is calculated to be influenced by the suggestions of
adults. As the court observed, had the fight and injury occurred on the
parking lot it would have been compensable. "To cut it off when they moved
into the boxing ring would, we think, be unreasonable and contrary to
previous commitments to construe the Act liberally, to give effect to its
'
Thus, the court held that there
purpose-the protection of employees." 325
was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the challenge to fight and
the ensuing boxing match were directed against the claimant as an employee
or because of his employment and were not based upon any personal matter
between the claimant and the other gladiator.
While it is obvious that the court reached the correct conclusion, a close
reading of the court's cited authority reveals that only two of the twelve cases
cited by the court were even remotely connected to the pertinent issue before
the court. Even those two opinions involved assaults by co-employees and
were not factually or legally relevant to the particular problem at hand .326 The
Beaumont court never cited or discussed the very cogent and relevant opinion
by the Amarillo court in Texas Indemnity InsuranceCo. v. Cheely ,327 which is
at the present time the authoritative statement in this area of compensation
law.
Course and Scope of Employment-Self-Inflicted Injury. A workman's
willful attempt to injure himself is theoretically noncompensable. 328 During
the last survey year the supreme court, in a strained, convoluted opinion,
upheld a jury verdict favorable to the beneficiaries in Gregory v. Texas
Employers' Insurance Ass 'n. 3 29 Although the carrier was unable to produce
direct evidence of suicide, it did produce overwhelming circumstantial evidence on the issue. Nevertheless, the court found some evidence of accidental injury and remanded the case to the court of civil appeals for consideration
of factual insufficiency points of error. On remand 330 the court of civil appeals
incredibly held that the jury's accidental injury finding was not contrary to the
great weight and preponderance of the evidence. The court reached this
conclusion despite the fact that in its first opinion, after carefully reviewing
all of the overwhelming circumstantial evidence demonstrating suicide, the
court held that the only reasonable conclusion which could be drawn from the
evidence was the fact that the employee willfully and intentionally injured
33 1
himself.
325. Id. at 474.
326. The only opinions cited by the court even remotely connected to the issue before the
court were Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Bradley, 415 S.W.2d 928 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1967, no
writ), and Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. England, 212 S.W.2d 964 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1948,
no writ). In Bradley the claimant was assaulted by a co-employee regarding the manner of
carrying out the employer's business. England involved an assault on the claimant by a
co-employee and co-union member on the employer's premises but prior to starting work. The
fight evolved out of the fact that the claimant was behind in his union dues. In a highly
questionable opinion the Beaumont court held the injury compensable.
327. 232 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1950, writ ref'd).
328. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § I (Vernon 1967).
329. 530 S.W.2d 105 (Tex. 1975), reviewed in Sartwelle, supra note 3, at 220-22.
330. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Gregory, 534 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. City. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1976, no writ).
331. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Gregory, 521 S.W.2d 898, 902 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston [14th Dist.]), rev'd, 530 S.W.2d 105 (Tex. 1975).
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Another case involving intentional self-injury was decided by the Austin
court of civil appeals in Watkins v. Texas Employers'InsuranceAss'n.332 The
jury found in favor of the beneficiaries, but the trial court granted the carrier's
motion for judgment non obstante veredicto. The evidence revealed that the
decedent, a road grader operator on a highway construction project, died
from a gunshot wound to the left side of his head. No one saw the shooting,
but the evidence revealed that the bullet which struck the decedent came from
his own semi-automatic rifle which was found locked in the rifle rack behind
the seat of his company-owned pick-up truck. The muzzle of the rifle was
pointed toward the passenger side of the truck, where the decedent was
discovered. The evidence was disputed concerning the decedent's emotional
status. Some witnesses indicated that he had discussed many future plans
with them, but other evidence demonstrated emotional disturbances for
which he had been hospitalized on at least three different occasions.
There was no evidence that the employer required its employees to carry
firearms, but the testimony indicated that employees routinely carried rifles
in their pick-ups and that there was no company rule prohibiting such
practice. Although the employees occasionally used rifles to kill rattlesnakes,
there was no evidence that the decedent had ever used the rifle to shoot
snakes or any other animals that may have interfered with the job.
The bulk of the court's opinion dealt with the special issues submitted to the
jury and the beneficiaries' failure to request appropriate issues. The court
held that, contrary to the beneficiaries' contention, there was no direct
evidence indicating an accidental injury. The evidence that other employees
carried rifles and occasionally used them to kill snakes or potentially dangerous animals interfering with the job did not necessarily indicate that the
decedent carried his rifle for that purpose. Since reasonable minds could draw
different conclusions from the meager evidence introduced, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment.
Extent and Duration of Disability-Sufficiency of Expert Testimony. In
Robinson v. Argonaut Insurance Co. 13 the Fort Worth court of civil appeals
reviewed the supreme court's extensive writing on the problem of the
phraseology of expert testimony concerning the future consequences of an
injury.334 In Robinson the trial court excluded portions of the testimony of the
claimant's expert witness dealing with the permanency of the injury because
the testimony was phrased in terms of likelihood rather than in terms of
reasonable medical probability. This testimony represented the claimant's
only offer of proof concerning the extent and duration of his disability, and
the carrier's two physicians had testified that the claimant could return to
work. Thus, there was no evidence that the claimant's condition was perma332. 534 S.W.2d 443 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
333. 534 S.W.2d 953 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
334. See, e.g., Western Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Gonzales, 518 S.W.2d 524 (Tex. 1975) (Greenhill,
C.J., dissenting); Griffin v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 450 S.W.2d 59 (Tex. 1969); Insurance
Co. of N. America v. Kneten, 440 S.W.2d 52 (Tex. 1969); Parker v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins.
Co., 440 S.W.2d 43 (Tex. 1969); Otis Elevator Co. v. Wood, 436 S.W.2d 324 (Tex. 1968);
Insurance Co. of N. America v. Meyers, 411 S.W.2d 710 (Tex. 1966).
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nent. The jury, apparently relying upon the carrier's expert testimony, limited
the claimant's recovery to several months of temporary total disability and
several months of temporary partial disability. The court of civil appeals,
however, finding that the exclusion of the expert testimony was error,
reversed and remanded the case for a new trial.
The court discussed at length the gradual dilution of the reasonable medical
probability requirement, primarily relying upon Justice Steakley's article
analyzing the admissibility of expert medical testimony in various categories
of cases.335 The court concluded that the reasonable medical probability rule
does not prevail in Texas insofar as the future consequences of present
injuries are concerned, specifically relying upon Western Casualty & Surety
Co. v. Gonzales 336 wherein the supreme court wrote:
The form of that expert testimony is not so important as its substance.
Certainly a doctor is not required to use the usual expression that there is
a 'reasonable probability' of causal
connection between original injury
337
and present physical condition.
Course and Scope of Employment-Travel. The general rule is that injuries
suffered by employees while traveling on public streets and highways in going
to and returning from work are not compensable. 338 The exception to the
general rule is found in article 8309, section lb. 3 39 In addition to coming within
the terms of section Ib, an employee must also prove that his injuries were of
a kind and character that had to do with and originated in the work, business,
trade, or profession of the employer and were received while the employee
was engaged in or about the furtherance of the affairs or business of the
employer as provided in section I of article 8309. 310 During this survey year
the El Paso court of civil appeals decided two travel cases which were
factually identical. Both Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n v. Byrd341 and
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Chesnut 342 involved oil well workers being
transported to and from the rig location on a public highway by their driller.
In Chestnut a drilling crew of four was en route from Odessa to the rig
335. Steakley, Expert Medical Testimony in Texas, I ST. MARY'S L.J. 161 (1969).
336. 518 S.W.2d 524 (Tex. 1975) (Greenhill, C.J., dissenting).
337. Id. at 526. The court went even further than its holding that the expert medical testimony
need not be based on reasonable medical probability. The court also held that the medical expert
need not even understand the medical basis for his "expert" opinion: "This Court has never
required that the medical expert explain or even understand the precise biochemistry or
mechanism by which the initial trauma affects the health or organs of the injured party." Id. at
527 (emphasis added). This is a patently absurd statement that may have consequences beyond
the scope of the Gonzales case. The statement is made even worse by the court's ultimate holding
in the case. See Sartwelle, supra note 3, at 222-24.
338. American Gen. Ins. Co. v. Coleman, 157 Tex. 377, 303 S.W.2d 370 (1957).
339. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § lb (Vernon 1967):
Unless transportation is furnished as a part of the contract of employment or is
paid for by the employer, or unless the means of such transportation are under the
control of the employer, or unless the employee is directed in his employment to
proceed from one place to another place, such transportation shall not be the
basis for a claim that an injury occurring during the course of such transportation
is sustained in the course of employment.
340. Id. § I; see, e.g., Agricultural Ins. Co. v. Dryden, 398 S.W.2d 745 (Tex. 1965); Shelton v.
Standard Ins. Co., 389 S.W.2d 290 (Tex. 1965); Janak v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 381
S.W.2d 176 (Tex. 1964); Texas Gen. Indem. Co. v. Bottom, 365 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. 1963).
341. 540 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
342. 539 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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location, a distance of approximately 105 miles. The driller was driving his
personal automobile and transporting the three members of his crew. All were
killed except Chesnut. Under a written agreement with the driller, the
employer paid him $. 14 per mile for travel to and from the job site, and the
driller was responsible for having the crew on the job. In order to compete in
the labor market the company offered its drillers the mileage payment as extra
compensation. Each driller hired his own crew, and while the crew was not
required to ride with the driller, they were normally told when they were hired
that they would have this free transportation and most of them usually rode
with the driller. The driller had the right to hire and fire and could therefore
fire any crew member who refused to ride with him.
In Byrd the driller and his three crew members had completed their tour of
duty and were returning from a rig location in New Mexico to their homes in
Monahans, Texas. The driller was the owner and operator of the pick-up
truck in which the men were riding. The rig location was approximately 100
miles from Monahans, and there was no public transportation since it was
located in a remote area which did not have living accommodations. The
driller in this case was paid $. 12 per mile. The driller again had the authority to
hire his crew members, and at the time of employment he advised them free
transportation would be available to the rig site. The driller picked up the crew
members at their homes each day and returned them to their homes after the
day's work. Again, the driller was expected to have his own crew available
and ready for work at the beginning of each day's shift.
Chesnut and Byrd presented two issues: whether the driller was entitled to
compensation and whether the crew members were in the course and scope of
their employment and were, therefore, entitled to compensation. The driller's
case was not before the court in Byrd but was before the court in Chesnut.
With respect to the driller, the court held that he came within the second
exception in section lb, i.e., transportation paid for by the employer. The
drilling crew members in both cases came within the first exception in section
lb, i.e., transportation furnished as a part of the contract of employment.
This holding alone, of course, is not sufficient to sustain compensation since
the employees must also demonstrate that their injuries were received while
engaged in or about the furtherance of the employer's business.
The court easily found that the injuries to the driller and crew members
arose out of the employer's business because of the remote drilling site and
because of the necessity of having a full crew available to begin work at each
shift change. In so holding the court relied upon two analogous supreme court
opinions, Janak v. Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n 343 and Johnson v.
Pacific Employers Indemnity Co. 34 4 as well as an almost identical case
decided prior to the statutory amendment concerning travel, Texas Employers'InsuranceAss 'n v. Inge. 345 In Janak the claimant was a member of a
drilling crew and participated in a car pool. At the time of the accident the
claimant was a passenger in a fellow crew member's personal automobile.
343.

381 S.W.2d 176 (Tex. 1964).

344. 439 S.W.2d 824 (Tex. 1969).
345.

146 Tex. 347, 208 S.W.2d 867 (1948).
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That particular crew member had deviated from the usual route of travel in
order to obtain ice to be taken to the job site. The supreme court held that by
procuring ice for the crew's drinking water the driver of the automobile was
performing services in furtherance of the employer's business. The court
concluded that since drinking water was reasonably essential to the continuation of the drilling operation a deviation in the route taken in order to obtain
ice was impliedly authorized by the employer. The court refused to distinguish between the automobile owner-operator and the passenger-claimant in
allowing compensation, pointing out that making this diatinction would mean
that the members of the car pool would ha.ve to abandon the car pool
whenever the driver deviated from the normal route.
The El Paso court cogently recognized that Janak was factually different
from both Byrd and Chesnut because in Janak all of the crew members were
charged with the responsibility of obtaining the ice and, therefore, impliedly
were authorized to deviate from the normal travel route in order to obtain it.
In Chesnut and Byrd, however, only the drillers were paid. The court also
noted the supreme court's opinion in Johnson wherein the court again
emphasized that providing ice and water at a drilling site was a benefit to the
employer and, therefore, authorized a deviation in route. The underlying
rationale in both Janak and Johnson, according to the El Paso court, was the
fact that a plan or arrangement that was of benefit to the employer was
involved in each case. In Chesnut and Byrd the plan was getting the crew to
the rig site so that they would all be available for work at the same time.
Transporting the driller alone to the rig site would have been worth nothing to
the employer since he could not continue the drilling operation without the
crew members.
The El Paso court also discussed the supreme court's 1948 Inge opinion.
Inge was almost factually identical to both Chesnutand Byrd in that Inge was
also a member of a drilling crew killed in a car accident on a public highway
while going to and from the drilling site in a remote area of Pecos County. Inge
was paid $.07 per mile, and that satisfied the then court-made requirement
that the transportation be furnished by the employer as a part of the contract
of employment. With respect to the requirement that the injury occur in the
furtherance of the employer's business, the Inge court's rationale3 46 was
closely followed by the court in Byrd:
Our holding is that the requirement of the employees being in the
course and scope of their employment in the furtherance of the employer's affairs is satisfied by the undisputed facts as to the plan of
getting them to and from the job location in a remote area and the benefits
which such plan conferred upon the employer. The necessity for such a
plan in order for the operations of the drilling rig to be continuous, and
In Inge the court stated:
The location of the drilling site in an uninhabited area made it essential that the
[employer] furnish transportation to his employees in order to induce them to
work on this job. The substance of the arrangement was that the members of the
drilling crew were being transported to the well location free of cost to them; and
this was an important part of their contract of employment. . . .The employer's
affairs and business were being furthered by the transportation of the members of
the crew to and from the well site in Inge's automobile as effectively as if the
employer himself owned the automobile which was being used.
id. at 352, 208 S.W.2d at 869.
346.
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place them within the course of their

Wage Rate. The statutory method provided to compute the monetary
recovery in compensation cases is tied to the claimant's wage rate, 348 and the
establishment of wage rate is an integral part of the statutory scheme of
compensation. Wage rate is a technical issue, sometimes little understood by
either attorneys or the courts. The issue has generated a substantial amount of
litigation over the years3 49 simply because it provides an avenue by which a
carrier's ultimate dollar liability can be greatly reduced, especially as the
compensation rate during periods of partial incapacity is affected. The
claimant's lack of appreciation for the technicalities of wage rate is again
demonstrated in this survey year by the Tyler court's opinion in Garcia v.
350
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.
The burden of proof on the wage rate issue is upon the claimant.3 51 He must
show by competent evidence that his wages cannot be computed under
subdivision I of article 8309, section 1352 before resort can be had to subdivision 2 of that section. The claimant must prove the inapplicability of subdivision 2 by competent evidence before resort can be had to subdivision 3, the
just and fair provision. 353 Garcia was a carpenter's helper. He testified that he
did not work at least 210 days as a carpenter's helper in the twelve-month
period preceding the date of his injury. This testimony excluded the application of subdivision 1 of the wage rate statute. 354 Garcia, attempting to prove
his wages by evidence of another employee's earnings as provided by the
second subdivision, offered the testimony of a carpenter. The claimant's
witness, Goodwin, testified on direct examination that he was a carpenter and
that he had worked 210 days in the year preceding the claimant's injury. On
cross-examination, however, Goodwin admitted that he did not know how
many days he had actually worked but stated that he did work every day that it
did not rain. Unfortunately, he did not know how many days it had not rained.
The second subdivision requires that wage rate be proven by evidence of
another employee's earnings "of the same class . . .in the same or in a
similar employment, in the same or a neighboring place ....
.311 The term
"same or similar employment" means generally that the employee must be
doing the same class or type of work as the claimant whose wage rate is being
determined. Although this work need not be identical, it must be of the same
347. 540 S.W.2d at 462.
348. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, §§ 10, II, 12 (Vernon Supp. 1976-77); id. art. 8309, §
I (Vernon 1967).
349. See, e.g., Aetna Ins. Co. v. Giddens, 476 S.W.2d 664 (Tex. 1972);Texas Employers' Ins.
Ass'n v. Shannon, 462 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. 1970); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Hale, 400
S.W.2d 310 (Tex. 1966); Griffin v. Superior Ins. Co., 161 Tex. 195,338 S.W.2d 415 (19t );Texas
Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Ford, 153 Tex. 470, 271 S.W.2d 397 (1954); Southern Underwriters v.
Schoolcraft, 138 Tex. 323, 158 S.W.2d 991 (1942).
350. 542 S.W.2d 477 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, no writ).
351. E.g., Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Shannon, 462 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. 1970); Texas
Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Ford, 153 Tex. 470, 271 S.W.2d 397 (1954).
352. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art 8309, § I (Vernon 1967).
353. Id. § 1(3).

354.

Id. § (l).

355.

Id. § 1(2).
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general nature. The Tyler court, in affirming the trial court's take nothing
judgment, found that the claimant had failed to prove his wages under
subdivision 2:
Even if Goodwin [claimant's witness] worked 210 days he was not a
workman of the same class.
* . . Appellant failed to prove the average weekly wage rate of another
employee of the same class who had worked 210 days during the prior
year, and the jury so found under [S]ubsection (2). Appellant failed to
request an issue under [S]ubsection (3) on 'just and fair' wage rate, but (3)
may be resorted to only after the claimant has met 'his burden of proving
competent evidence that
his wages cannot be computed under
'35
[Slubdivisions (1) or (2). 1
General Injury vs. Specific Injury. The Tyler court of civil appeals wrote an
interesting and instructive opinion regarding simultaneous recovery for a
general injury and for a specific injury in Highlands UnderwritersInsurance
Co. v. Harris.3 58 The jury found that the claimant suffered a total and
permanent loss of use of his right leg below the knee. The jury also found that
the claimant suffered a general bodily injury, other than the leg injury, which
resulted in permanent partial incapacity. The trial court awarded the claimant
compensation of $63 per week for 125 weeks for the loss of use of his right leg
below the knee and awarded 300 weeks at $33.33 per week for the general
incapacity. The carrier's appeal was predicated on the fact that the trial
court's judgment was contrary to the specific injury statute, article 8306,
section 12.

3

11

The claimant contended that he suffered a general injury and a specific
injury when a tree fell on his left shoulder injuring his leg and back. The
claimant did not plead or allege that his specific injury extended to or affected
his body generally. The trial court affirmatively instructed the jury that in

determining the general incapacity issues they would not take into consideration the effects of the condition of the claimant's right ankle.
The Tyler court cited and discussed the very few Texas cases that have

even inferentially addressed the concurrent injury issue. 36 The court found
356. See, e.g., Central Sur. & Ins. Corp. v. Jordan, 410 S.W.2d 60 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1966, no writ); Pan Am. Ins. Co. v. Stokes, 370 S.W.2d 955 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1963, no
writ); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Woodall, 356 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1962, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Ebers, 134 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1939,
writ dism'd jdgmt cor.).
357. 542 S.W.2d at 479-80, citing Aetna Ins. Co. v. Giddens, 476 S.W.2d 664 (Tex. 1972).
358. 530 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
359. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 12 (Vernon 1967), which provides in part:
For the injuries enumerated in the following schedule the employee shall
receive in lieu of all other compensation except medical aid ...
Where the employee sustains concurrent injuries resulting in concurrent
incapacities, he shall receive compensation only for the injury which produces
the longest period of incapacity; but this section shall not affect liability for the
concurrent loss or the loss of the use thereof of more than one (I) member, for
which member compensation is provided in this schedule, compensation for
specific injuries under this law shall be cumulative as to time and not concurrent.
In all cases of permanent partial incapacity it shall be considered that the
permanent loss of the use of the member is equivalent to, and shall draw the same
compensation as the loss of that member; but the compensation in and by said
schedule provided shall be in lieu of all other compensation in such cases.
360. The cases cited and discussed by the court were: Hargrove v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co.,
152 Tex. 243, 256 S.W.2d 73 (1953);Texas Gen. Indemn. Co. v. Scott, 152 Tex. 1,253 S.W.2d 651
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that the San Antonio court's opinion in Muro v. Houston Fire & Casualty
Insurance Co.,36 Justice Pope writing for the court, dealt with a situation
almost identical to the facts in Harris. Muro held that a claimant seeking
recovery for a general injury and for a concurrent specific injury which is
found to be a total and permanent injury may only take under the section
which provides him the most compensation. Relying upon Muro, the Tyler
court held:
As pointed out in Muro and Section 12, Art. 8306, the claimant who
takes under the specific injury provisions of Section 12 takes in lieu of all
other compensation.
The claimant here is entitled to recovery under the section which
produces the longest period of incapacity or which gives him the greatest
compensation, but he is 362
not entitled to recover for both the general injury
and the specific injury.
Thus, the court reversed that portion of the judgment awarding compensation for the loss of use of the leg below the knee and affirmed that portion of
the judgment awarding compensation for permanent partial incapacity since
the latter represented the greater amount of compensation.
II. PROCEDURAL LAW
CollateralBenefits. Lauderdale v. Insurance Co. of North America 363 concerned the introduction of evidence that the claimant was covered by a group
insurance policy at the time of his injury. The claimant contended that he was
injured on the job on September 21, 1971. The carrier contended that the
employee was actually injured at home while moving a deep freeze. In
support of this theory the carrier introduced into evidence the employee's
claim form which he presented to Aetna Insurance Company, the employer's
group insurance carrier. In that claim form, the claimant alleged that he had
sustained an injury on the night of September 20, 1971, while moving a deep
freeze in his home. The claimant sought to introduce evidence, in rebuttal to
the carrier's theory, that the Aetna group policy afforded him benefits which
were almost equal to the compensation benefits. The claimant's contention
was that there was no reason for him to falsely claim that he had been injured
on the job since both policies afforded almost identical recoveries.
The court held that it was error to exclude the claimant's evidence. Since
the claimant's evidence would circumstantially tend to rebut the carrier's
contention that the claimant falsified his story about being injured on the job,
the court considered the evidence relevant and admissible but found that its
exclusion was harmless error under the facts and circumstances of the case.
Although the claimant raised a number of other points of error, the court held
that the claimant had not preserved any of the points for review and affirmed
the trial court's take nothing judgment.
(1953); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Moreno, 277 S.W. 84 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1925, jdgmt
adopted); Muro v. Houston Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 310 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1958, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Yother, 306 S.W.2d 730 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1957, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
361. 310 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1958, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
362. 530 S.W.2d at 353 (emphasis in original).
363. 527 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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In another collateral source case, Standard Fire Insurance Co. v. Ratcliff, 364 the court held that the claimant was entitled to recover medical
expenses already paid by a disability insurance carrier. The compensation
carrier had refused to pay medical expenses or compensation and, therefore,
the claimant had submitted the medical bills to the employer's group insurance carrier. The group carrier paid the medical expenses but did not
intervene in the claimant's suit for recovery of the expenses. The trial court
awarded the claimant a recovery.
On appeal the compensation carrier contended that the claimant's recovery
of medical expenses should be disallowed, because the employee did not pay
the expenses and to allow his recovery would be unjust enrichment. The
Waco court, however, rejected this contention, noting that the statute covering medical expenses 365 provides that the employee has the sole right to select
the person and facility to provide medical treatment and that the association
shall be obligated for such expenses. The court relied upon several prior
cases 366 which held that payment of a claimant's medical expenses by a third
party does not deprive the claimant of the right to recover the value of such
services from the compensation carrier. Thus, the court upheld the claimant's
recovery. Ratcliff illustrates the type of double recovery which persistently
escalates the cost of all types of insurance. One solution to this problem
would be for the compensation carrier to suggest to the group insurance
carrier that it intervene in the compensation suit and seek reimbursement for
the expenses which the group carrier has already paid. Many group insurance
policies now have subrogation clauses which would provide for such reimbursement. In this manner, if the employee recovers, the group carrier can at
least credit the recovery back against the employer's experience rating and
perhaps reduce the employer's premium.
Nonsuit. The controversy over the right to a nonsuit in compensation cases
was finally settled by the legislature with the adoption of article 8307d, 367
effective June 19, 1975. That statute provides that an appeal from an Industrial Accident Board award may be nonsuited at any time before the jury
retires for deliberation, but only after notice to all partiesanda hearing. Prior
to the adoption of the amendment when the carrier appealed the Board's
award and the claimant filed an answer without asserting a counterclaim the
carrier could extinguish the claimant's cause of action against the carrier by
nonsuiting the action. This result derived from the well-established principle
that the mere filing of suit completely vacates the Board's award as to the
parties to the suit. 368 Two cases arose during the survey year wherein the
carrier, prior to the nonsuit amendment, attempted to nonsuit an appeal from
the Board's award. Although the opinions may be of only historical interest,
364.
365.
366.
367.

537 S.W.2d 355 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, no writ).
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 7 (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
See 537 S.W.2d at 358-59 and cases cited and discussed therein.
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307d (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).

368.

See, e.g., Latham v. Security Ins. Co., 491 S.W.2d 100 (Tex. 1972); Texas Reciprocal

Ins. Ass'n v. Leger, 128 Tex. 319, 97 S.W.2d 677 (1936); Zurich Gen. Accident & Liab. Co. v.
Rogers, 128 Tex. 313, 97 S.W.2d 674 (1936).

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 31

they are well-reasoned and obviously quite correct in their results. Both the
Fort Worth court in James v. Texas Employers'InsuranceAss 'n369 and the
Corpus Christi court in Barton v. Pacific Employers Indemnity Co. 370 concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the carrier to
nonsuit the appeal when the claimant had merely filed a general denial answer
and no counterclaim. Since article 8307d has become effective, however, this
problem should not arise, and each party should now have its day in court as
the legislature contemplated.
Special Issues. Occasionally a case arises in which the date of injury and the
beginning of disability are separated by a number of years rather than
following immediately upon injury or even within a few weeks or months.
This particular factual situation may dictate a reconsideration of the issues
and instructions to be submitted to the jury in order to determine if there may
have been multiple interrupted periods of incapacity. Such a situation arose in
Texas Employers 'Insurance Ass 'n v. Loesch,371 but unfortunately the Waco
court rejected the carrier's attempt to submit equally both sides of the
dispute.
Loesch suffered a back injury on May 8, 1963. After thirteen weeks of
conservative medical treatment he returned to work on light duty for the same
employer. On January 1, 1964, the claimant resumed his regular duties
building truck tires and continued his regular employment duties until 1971.
The claimant testified that during this period of time he worked while in pain
because of his financial obligations, especially the medical expenses of his
young son who was a hemophiliac. The employee finally sought additional
medical help in 1971. He underwent a lumbar laminectomy in May 1971 and a
second back surgery in the fall of 1971.
At trial the carrier requested a special issue which would have allowed the
jury to consider whether the claimant had endured several different periods
of temporary total disability. The carrier's proof was directed to the theory
that the claimant had sustained a period of temporary total disability in 1963
immediately following the injury but had recovered and had not been disabled
until his surgery in 1971. Thereafter, the carrier conceded, the jury could have
found temporary total disability following the first surgery and perhaps after
the second surgery, or even permanent disability. The trial court denied the
carrier's issue and simply submitted the usual disjunctive form of total
incapacity. In the disjunctive submission the jury is simply requested to
determine whether the total incapacity is permanent or temporary. 372 The
jury found total and permanent disability beginning on the date of injury in
1963. On appeal one of the carrier's points of error was the trial court's refusal
to submit the special issue allowing the jury to consider the possibility of
multiple interrupted periods of temporary total incapacity.
369. 532 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
370. 532 S.W.2d 128 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
371. 538 S.W.2d 435 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
372. 2 STATE BAR oF TEXAS, TEXAS PATrERN JURY CHARGES §§ 22.05, 22.06 (1970) illustrate
the usual disjunctive submission.
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The court of civil appeals rejected the carrier's argument, primarily on the
basis that the carrier's special issue constituted an inferential rebuttal issue.
The court also held, rather absurdly, that the jury's total and permanent

finding rendered the requested issue immaterial.3 73 Obviously, the jury's
finding would make the requested issue immaterial, but that, of course, is not
the point. The issue is whether all theories of recovery and defense are to be

submitted prior to rather than after the return of the jury's verdict. In the
usual case the normal disjunctive submission is adequate to submit the

claimant's theory, i.e., permanent total or permanent partial disability and the
carrier's defense, i.e., temporary total or temporary partial disability.
There is nothing in the Compensation Act which requires that compensation be paid in any particular uninterrupted form. Theoretically, there can be
an unlimited number of interrupted periods of incapacity.374 Further, issues
and instructions allowing a jury to consider the possibility of multiple
rebuttal issues
interrupted periods of incapacity do not constitute inferential
7
and, therefore, are not prohibited under rule 277.1 1
Obviously, a judgment may easily be entered on a jury's finding of multiple
periods of incapacity. It is submitted that if the evidence raises the issue of
multiple interrupted periods of incapacity the jury charge may and should
reflect the evidence.
Sufficiency of the Evidence. As usual, there were a number of cases during
the survey year involving the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence.
Although a majority of the cases were appeals by insurance carriers of
substantial awards in favor of employees 376 (which were affirmed), 37 surpris373. 538 S.W.2d at 440.
374. These unlimited interrupted periods of incapacity would exist, of course, in theory only.
Compensation for any combination of incapacity is limited to 401 weeks from the date of injury.
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, §§ 10, 11 (Vernon, Supp. 1976-77). The phrase "from the
date of injury" was the real reason that the carrier in Loesch insisted upon an issue allowing the
jury to consider interrupted periods of disability and the real reason for the carrier's appeal. It has
been held on several occasions that the 401-week compensation period begins to run from the
date of injury not the date disability begins. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. America v. Williams, 129
Tex. 51,99 S.W.2d 905 (1937); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. White, 129 Tex. 659, 107 S.W.2d
360 (1937); Jones v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 128 Tex. 437, 99 S.W.2d 903 (1937); Texas
Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Guidry, 128 Tex. 433, 99 S.W.2d 900 (1937). Thus, in Loesch, if the
carrier had convinced the jury that the claimant's incapacity began in the spring of 1971 at the
time of the first surgery, the compensation period (401 weeks or a little more than 7 1h years)
would have almost been exhausted, and the claimant's recovery would have been limited even if
the jury had awarded total and permanent disability benefits.
375. TEX. R. Civ. P. 277. Professor Hodges, the authority on special issues, defines inferential
rebuttal issues as follows:
These issues are denial issues, in the sense that they disprove some element of
the opponent's case or defense. They are argumentative denials, or as generally
termed, inferential rebuttals, rather than direct negatives. This is because they
disprove by establishing the truth of a positive factual theory which is inconsistent with the existence of some factual element of the ground of recovery or
defense relied upon by the opponent, and are therefore to be distinguished from a
flat denial, a mere 'no.'
They are 'evidentiary issues' in the sense that they present evidence tending to
show that some other issue should be answered in the negative. They are
evidentiary issues also in the sense that a favorable answer on such an issue--an
inferential rebuttal-cannot alone support a judgment; a negative answer to the
opponent's direct issue submitting an element of his ground of recovery or
defense is also necessary.
G. HOD3ES, SPECIAL ISSUE SUBMISSION IN TEXAS 40-41 (1959) (emphasis added).
376. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Loesch, 538 S.W.2d 435 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976,
writ ref'd n.r.e.) (affirming a total and permanent verdict); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rodriguez,
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ingly, there were also three no-injury cases which were affirmed on appeal. 378
Three other cases involving sufficiency of the evidence presented significant issues for analysis. In Seeton v. Aetna Casualty& Surety Co. 379 the court
reversed and remanded a judgment in the claimant's favor because the jury
failed to award temporary total disability. The claimant injured her back on
January 10, 1974, and underwent a lumbar laminectomy and fusion for which
she remained hospitalized for twenty-seven days. At the time of trial in April
1975 she had not returned to work. A Dallas County jury found only
temporary partial disability from the date of injury to August 1975, resulting
in a judgment of slightly more than $3,600. The court of civil appeals held that
the jury's finding that the employee sustained no total incapacity was against
the great weight and preponderance of the evidence and remanded the case
for a new trial.
In Garcia v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. 380 the employee attacked a jury
finding of no disability as being legally and factually unsupported by the
evidence. The employee, a carpenter's helper, struck his head on a rafter and
suffered a laceration. He claimed the injury resulted in temporary unconsciousness. The employee alleged that after his scalp was sutured he began
having headaches and vomiting and that his vision became blurred in one eye.
He was hospitalized on two occasions for a total of ten to twelve days. The
claimant never returned to work, and continued to complain of head pain,
dizziness, and blurred vision.
The carrier produced medical evidence from a neurosurgeon and an
ophthalmologist, both of whom testified that the employee's condition at all
times was normal and that his complaints were subjective only. The only
reason for the claimant's hospitalization was as a precautionary measure to
make certain that the complaints did not indicate serious pathology. The court
noted that the occurrence of the injury was not disputed. However, the only
evidence produced by the employee concerning any total or partial disability
was his own testimony, which was effecively countered by the medical
testimony that he suffered no disability because of the injury. Since the
claimant's testimony was that of an interested witness, it created nothing
more than a fact issue for the jury. Thus, the court concluded that there was
sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding of no disability.
537 S.W.2d 522 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, no writ) (affirming a total and permanent
verdict); Commercial Standard Fire & Marine Co. v. Murphy, 537 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, no writ) (affirming a temporary total and permanent partial
verdict); Gulf Ins. Co. v. Gibbs, 534 S.W.2d 720 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (affirming a total and permanent verdict); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Stanley, 534
S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (affirming a total and permanent
verdict); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Nelson, 534 S.W.2d 150 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (affirming a permanent partial verdict); State Highway Dep't v. Maris, 532
S.W.2d 690 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, no writ) (affirming a total and permanent verdict).
377. Unfortunately, these cases seem to be affirmed on a random basis which offers no

particular useful rationale for analyzing and reconciling these decisions or any of the thousands

of other court of civil appeals opinions involving legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence in

substantial verdict cases.

378. Mayfield v. Employers Reinsurance Corp., 539 S.W.2d 398 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Field v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 537 S.W.2d 130 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Eastland 1976, no writ); Reed v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 535 S.W.2d 377 (Tex. Civ. App.-

Beaumont 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

379. 535 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1976, no writ).
380. 542 S.W.2d 477 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, no writ).
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One of the most amazing cases occurring during this survey year, or
perhaps any year since the enactment of the Compensation Act in 1913, was
the Corpus Christi court's reversal of a total and permanent verdict in
3s
Commercial Insurance Co. v. Puente. 1
In Puente the claimant was employed by the city of Corpus Christi as a
refuse collector. This required him to ride on the back of a sanitation truck,
picking up trash cans and putting the trash in the truck. The claimant injured
his back and subsequently underwent a double level laminectomy. He returned to work for the same employer approximately nine months after the
injury. He did not return to his former job, however, but was assigned to
lighter work as a flagman, truck driver, and light brush collector. The claimant
was employed in the lighter job capacity at the time of trial and was earning
$.25 an hour more than he had earned at the time of injury.
The four witnesses at trial were called by the claimant. The employee's
supervisor testified that the claimant was a steady worker both before and
after his injury and was performing his job without difficulty and without
complaint. The employee and his wife testified that the claimant could
perform the lighter job but could do little else because of fatigue and back
pain. Finally, the claimant's orthopedic surgeon testified that the claimant
could do the lighter work assigned to him but should not do the heavier work
required by his former job. Moreover, the doctor was given the definition of
partial incapacity as subsequently defined for the jury by the trial court and he
concluded that the claimant had a permanent partial disability. Based on this
evidence, the court concluded:
To uphold a recovery for total and permanent incapacity, the evidence
must show not just that the workman is disabled, and not just that such
disability be from performing the usual tasks of a workman, but the
evidence must show that the workman is disabled to such an extent that
he cannot get and keep employment. The testimony from this trial is
convincing that appellee [claimant] has suffered some permanent partial
incapacity. . . . But the overwhelming evidence from this record shows
that appellee's condition does not and has not prevented him from
obtaining and retaining permanent and lucrative employment calling for
lighter duties. . . . We are compelled to hold that the jury's finding. ..
was so contrary to the overwhelming weight and preponderance of all the
evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust.3" 2
Thus, the trial court's total and permanent judgment was reversed and the
case remanded for new trial, a result rarely observed in compensation cases
but perhaps a ray of light for the future.

381.
382.

535 S.W.2d 948 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
Id. at 952-53.

